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This paper has three goals. The first is to describe and evaluate patterns in retirement
asset accumulation in order to offer an assessment of the claim that Americans do a poor job of
preparing for retirement. The second is to evaluate patterns of retirement asset decumulation, in
order to determine whether the available financial and other tools are available to achieve
satisfactory consumption during retirement. Finally, given what we have found, we outline
approaches to assist in improving the targeting and management of retirement accumulation and
decumulation paths.
Our discussion begins by describing patterns of wealth accumulation among American
families, drawing from a valuable new data set on saving patterns for a nationally representative
set of older households. We then compare the actual accumulations found in the data to a range of
saving benchmarks to identify the extent of saving shortfalls. Next, we examine which incentives
could enhance the rate of retirement asset accumulation. The discussion goes on to explore asset
allocation patterns of working people saving for retirement. We compare a range of financial
benchmarks with data from recent surveys on pension asset allocation information. In the third
substantive section of the paper, we describe and evaluate the process of retirement asset
decumulation. Targets offered by the financial community are again contrasted with behavior, and
factors influencing the retirement decumulation process described. In the final section of this paper
we gather our conclusions.
I. Wealth Accumulation on the Verge of Retirement
In order to decide whether people are saving enough for retirement we require evidence on
saving patterns of workers as they age, as well as on their retirement income needs. In this section
we explore a range of sources on patterns of retirement wealth accumulation, and ask whether
actual saving patterns are likely to be enough to protect retiree economic security.
It is important to start out with a statement of fact - namely, it is extraordinarily difficult to
find out about people’s saving rates and wealth levels. Indeed it is only recently that the inherently
imperfect exercise of measuring wealth has become easier because of newly devised and quite
elaborate survey instruments following the same people over time.
One problem in gathering wealth information is that a snapshot of assets at a moment in
time conceals fluctuations in asset values over time (e.g. stock prices, real estate values). In fact,
measuring wealth will always involve making judgments about a moving target. Another problem
is that wealth studies suffer from respondent recall - people have a hard time remembering what
assets they own and often do not know the values of these assets. This is particularly a concern
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unless the owner has purchased the house recently. A related consideration is that respondents
are sometimes unwilling to report wealth to survey interviewers, a reluctance thought to be most
concentrated among the wealthiest segment of society.
For all these reasons researchers have concluded that new data on wealth must be
developed, and a range of such surveys has begun to be fielded with which experts can begin to
correct some of the deficiencies of prior work. It appears that the effort and expense of these new
nationally representative surveys is worthwhile, particularly because careful design of wealth
questions in datasets  like the Health and Retirement Study @IRS) has produced much higher levels
of household wealth than those identified in previous studies (Smith 1995). These advances have
been accomplished by recognizing that some types of wealth are relatively easy to recall but other
types are not readily reportable. Thus for instance a respondent may remember his checking
account balance, but he may not know the value of his entire pension or social security retirement
annuity. Therefore another advance in data collection has been researchers’ capability to merge
with household members’ their social security earnings records as well as material taken from
employer-side pension records. This complex datafile  merge is only available under restricted
access circumstances to protect confidentiality of respondents. 1 Nonetheless these new fdes produce
more reliable and better quality wealth data than have ever been available in the past.
There is no single “gold standard” for measuring what is meant by wealth. Here we define
net financial wealth to be the sum of funds held in stocks, bonds, checking and saving accounts,
money market accumulations, business capital, and individual retirement accounts (e.g. IRA’s and
Keoghs). Some studies focus only on this concept on the argument that it is the most liquid form of
wealth holdings. A second commonly reported measure is net financial wealth nlus housing or
accessible wealth, that adds to the financial wealth total an estimate of net housing equity. The
third and most comprehensive wealth measure, termed here total net wealth, adds to the foregoing
a calculated measure of public and private retirement pensions. As will be explained below, this
last measure requires the inclusion of pension accumulations in defined contribution pension plans
(including 401(k) 1 ) p ans , and also necessitates the valuation of annuities from defined benefit and
social security pensions. Each of these terms will be examined in our assessment of wealth levels
and savings rates, below.
A. The Facts About Retirement Wealth
The Health and Retirement Study &IRS) affords an excellent opportunity for exploring asset
accumulation patterns of those near retirement. This study sampled more than 7600 households in
1992 where at least one family member was between the ages of 51 and 61. Unlike most other
’ See Mitchell, Olson, Steinmeier (1996) and Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick,  and Steimneier (1997).
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patterns, and saving behavior, the HRS follows these original households through time, re-
interviewing them every two years. In the future, this panel will provide a fertile data set for
studying how households accumulate assets preceding retirement, how they decumulate assets in
retirement, and how they manage bequests.
1. How Much Retirement Wealth do People Have?
One recent analysis of the first year of HRS data was undertaken by Gustman, Mitchell,
Samwick,  and Steinmeier (GMSS 1997), who explored wealth holdings of this cohort of people on
the verge of retirement. A summary of their results appears in Table I.A. 1. All data are weighted
to be representative of the US population in this age bracket, and dollar figures are presented in
1992 dollars. Mean values, the average for the median ten percent of households, and averages for
those households reporting each wealth source are presented along with the percentages of total
wealth each asset class represents. Wealth in that study is divided into three categories?
l Financial wealth, which includes business assets, financial assets (such as stocks, bonds,
and bank accounts less outstanding debt), dedicated retirement assets including IRA and Keogh
Accounts, and miscellaneous other fmancial;
*Net home equity for homeowners; and
*Retirement wealth, equal to the actuarial present value of future social security retirement
and survivor benefits, retirement pension benefits, and private retiree health insurance.3
The evidence shows that the average HRS household has just under half a million dollars in
total wealth. Total wealth for the median ten percent of households (i.e. the group between the 45th
and 55th percentile) is almost $340,000, slightly more than two-thirds of the mean for the entire
sample. The fact that the median is below the mean emphasizes the skewness of the wealth
distribution, a point to be discussed in greater depth below.
The composition of total wealth also differs for the mean and median households. For the
average HRS household, retirement wealth comprises slightly more than half of total wealth (52%),
financial wealth approximately one-third of total wealth (32%), and the value of housing makes up
the remaining fraction (16%). By contrast, for the median household, retirement wealth comprises
almost two-thirds (63%) of total assets, housing accounts for a fifth (20%), leaving financial assets
with the final 17% of total wealth. Social security wealth alone makes up 43% of total wealth for
households near the median total wealth, for total of about $145,000. For the household at the
2 Throughout this study we exclude the value of Medicare in retirement wealth.
3 Social security benefits include retirement benefits as well as survivor benefits; these figures are
computed using the intermediate assumptions used by the Social Security Administration to assess
its funding status. For further detail on construction of these data see Mitchell, Olson, and
Steinmeier (1996) and GMSS (1997).
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sample mean, social security wealth represents 27% of the total, or about $134,000 in present value
terms.
It is interesting to note that while most asset types have higher dollar values for the mean
than for the median household, the reverse holds for social security. This is in large part due to the
redistributive nature of social security benefits.
The two final columns of Table IA. 1 report the fraction of HRS households that holds
wealth in each of the specified categories, along with average values for those households with
nonzero holdings. Coverage by social security is near universal among HRS participants, with 96%
of households expecting some benefit from that system. A significant majority of sampled
households also holds some financial assets (88%) and most (80%) own their primary residence.
Slightly under two-thirds of the sample expects an employer provided pension, similar to overall
coverage levels for this age bracket in the United States. Business assets are held by only one third
of the sample (32%), but their average value, around $250,000, is quite large for those households
holding them.
Only 42% of HRS households - on the verge of retirement, it will be recalled - have any
personal dedicated retirement assets. The average value of these assets among those with positive
holdings is $47,000. People’s failure to take advantage of the tax advantages inherent in targeted
saving programs might be explained by household lack of understanding of the availability of these
programs, or perhaps because they do not value retirement saving. Alternatively, households may
choose to hold assets in non-tax-favored categories because of the increased flexibility and lack of
potential penalties for early withdrawal. The efficacy of dedicated retirement saving programs is
discussed in more detail in Section I.C., below.
More detail on the distribution of HRS assets appears in Table IA.2 and Figure I.A. 1.
Averages are given for the two extreme ventiles at each end of the total wealth distribution (O-5%,
5-lo%, and 90-95%, 95-100%) as well as for larger subgroups in the interior of the wealth
distribution. Averages are also presented for the entire sample as well as for the median 10% of
households. The final row of the Table presents the ratio of the average values for the 90-95%
ventile to that of the 5-10% ventile. Values are presented for total net wealth, pension wealth,
social security, home value, and net financial wealth. A graphical view of these data appears in
Figure I.A. 1, where the total height of each bar represents total net wealth by distribution
grouping. Components of wealth are represented in each bar by the height of each subsection.
The evidence further substantiates the above-noted inequality in the distribution of wealth.
Households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution have total wealth in excess of $lM, and would
seem to be quite well positioned for retirement. A very different pattern characterizes people at the
other end of the wealth distribution. Those in the second ventile have on average slightly over
$60,000 in net wealth. Households in the poorest ventile average less than $10,000 in total net
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worth. If the present value of future social security and pension benefits were subtracted from the
total, households in the bottom ventile of the wealth distribution have substantially negative net
worth.
Another way to describe the heterogeneity in wealth is to compute the ratio of wealth for the
90-95% ventile relative to that of the 5-10% ventile.4 This ratio, effectively a weighted average of
the various component parts for total wealth, is nearly 19. With the exception of social security,
the ratios for the other component pieces exceed those for total wealth. The ratio is largest for
pension wealth (310) and net financial wealth (222), indicating that these are the most unequally
distributed asset classes. The ratio for social security, 3.6, is much lower. This is a function of the
social security benefit formula in which benefits are a concave function of average past earnings,
giving more weight to the first dollars earned and less weight to higher earnings levels. There is
also a limit on the level of earnings used to calculate benefits, thereby giving a maximum possible
level of benefits (there are also family caps as well).
Net financial wealth gives a picture of the assets most readily usable for retirement
consumption. Along with pensions, this is the wealth category that is most highly skewed, a result
apparent in both tails of the distribution. Those in the 95-100%  ventile, with more than $1.5M in
net financial wealth, have nearly four times as much as those in the 90-95% ventile. At the other
end of the distribution, those in the poorest ventile have negative net financial wealth and are in
debt on the doorstep of retirement. Those in the next ventile up are similarly destitute, having an
average of less than $2,000 in net financial wealth - a scant three percent of total wealth.
A question arises as to whether wealth holdings are associated with various potential
explanatory factors. To this end, Table I.A.3 presents wealth by education, marital status, race of
the households primary respondent, and the households total household income in 1992.
Education level is broken down into four categories based on the highest level of educational
attainment by the households primary HRS interviewee. The categories are: less than a high
school degree, high school diploma or equivalent (GED), a bachelor’s degree, and an advanced
degree (e.g. master ‘s degree, PhD., law degree, or medical degree). Not surprisingly, levels of both
financial wealth and financial wealth plus housing are strongly increasing in education. Median
values for those without a high school diploma are $18,000 for financial wealth and $61,050 when
the value of housing is added. For those with advanced degrees, the corresponding median values
are $139,000 and $231,000, respectively.
The data also show that the share of wealth held in housing declines as education increases.
Housing value represents approximately 70% of net financial wealth plus housing for those without
4 These ventiles are used instead of the first and twentieth ventile because for some wealth
categories, specifically net financial wealth, the poorest ventile has negative wealth values. Also,
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a high school degrees, while for the other three groups, housing represents approximately 60%,
53%, and 40% (at the median). It is interesting to note that although those with advanced degrees
hold more financial wealth than those with bachelors degrees, they hold less housing wealth on an
absolute basis at the median. This may represent either a conscious choice to hold wealth in assets
that are more liquid than housing, or it might indicate that those who pursued education deferred
purchasing homes.
Splitting the sample by marital status reveals substantial differences for married couples,
single males, and single females (where single includes widowed, divorced, separated, and never
married individuals and their dependents). The median married couple has approximately three
times the financial wealth of the median single male, and eight times the financial wealth of the
single female household. Housing makes up about the same fraction of accessible financial wealth
(excluding pensions, social security, and retiree health insurance) for married couples and single
males, approximately 54% and 53% respectively, but housing is nearly 80% of accessible wealth for
single female-headed households. Single females also hold more housing wealth on an absolute
basis, although they hold less accessible wealth than their male counterparts. This may in part be
attributable to the split of assets in divorce.
A third wealth breakdown is by race. The HRS intentionally oversamples Black and
Hispanic households to provide a more accurate picture of the behavior of these minority
households.5 The evidence shows that the median HRS Black and Hispanic household on the verge
of retirement, has only $5000 in financial wealth. Whites hold substantially more wealth than
either Blacks or Hispanics, with approximately 11 times more financial wealth and approximately
four times as much when housing is included. For all racial groupings, housing wealth comprises
more than half of wealth at the median. Its importance is even greater for Black and Hispanic
households, where housing equity represents the vast majority of accessible wealth.
Patterns seen in household income mirror those observed in the wealth breakdowns. Net
financial wealth is far more unequally distributed across income than housing wealth: the ratio of
the median net financial wealth values for the highest to the lowest income quintile is
approximately 55, while for housing wealth the corresponding ratio is about 7.4. This reiterates
the substantial heterogeneity of wealth accumulation outside of home ownership.
Looking within each income quintile, we again find that the means are substantially larger
than the medians. This confirms substantial skewness in the distribution of wealth even after
controlling on respondents’ current income. This skewness is most pronounced for the lowest
income quintile, where mean wealth is 4.7 times greater than the median. Some of the households
average values for the wealthiest ventile may reflect the influence of a few extreme data pointss and
may therefore yield an upwardly biased result.
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at the very lowest end of the income distribution are probably temporarily experiencing low income
due to unemployment and disability, and in addition may include early retirees not yet eligible for
social security benefits. Conversely, the wide range of wealth levels observed even for those with
low current income suggests that saving and wealth accumulation is feasible for some at low income
levels.
A subject of considerable debate in the economics literature is whether the value of owner-
occupied housing should be included when assessing the sufficiency of assets for retirement. Some
analysts argue that housing wealth should not be taken into account, since retirees are
understandably reluctant to move from the houses they lived in while working (Venti and Wise
1991). They point out that this wealth is often not used to supplement consumption, instead
providing an emergency contingency fund for those who may need it, and serving as a bequest to
the heirs of those who do not. They also argue that high transaction costs associated with moving
make accessing the housing equity quite expensive.
By contrast, those who argue that people’s housing values should be counted in retirement
wealth point out that this is the single largest source of many peoples’ wealth, and it can be used to
increase consumption. They also point to the rapid growth in second mortgages and the potential
for growth in the reverse mortgage market.6 Their argument centers on the role of housing equity
as collateral - retirees do not need to leave their homes to make use their value.
Another way to think about how to include housing wealth as a component of retirement
assets involves decomposing mortgage payments into two parts - an investment component and a
consumption component. The investment component recognizes the purchase of the house as a
speculative investment in a tangible asset. A homeowner can subsequently sell the house and reap
the gains (or losses) of its change in value. Since it is a durable store of value, it also has use as
collateral. The consumption component represents what the homeowner would pay for housing
services, or for the non-homeowner, rent. Home ownership thereby encompasses two roles: renter
and landlord.
5For the present purposes, Asian and Native American households are included with whites due to
their relatively small representation in the population.
6 The market for reverse mortgages has been small but appears to be growing; to date fewer than
40,000 reverse mortgages have been underwritten. This total is expected to grow due to the Federal
Housing Administration’s adoption of the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program
under whose auspices about half of reverse mortgages have been underwritten. The introduction of
government and secondary market mechanisms as well as educating the elderly to the availability
of these products should spur growth; see for instance the Fannie Mae’s November 1996 Home
Keeper Mortgage program which is similar to HECM but provides higher loan limits (Cocheo 1996,
Nixon 1996). Rasmussen, Megbolugbe, and Morgan (1995) examine data from the 1990 census to
assess potential market demand. Limiting potential users of such products to households with
heads older than 69 with fully paid mortgages and home equity in excess of $30,000, they find a
potential 1990 market of as much as 6.7 million homes.
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As long as there is debt owed on the house, mortgage payments reflect two components:
consumption in the amount equivalent to the rental value of the property, and savings in the
amount that an additional mortgage payment represents increased equity in the house. Households
that have paid off their mortgages are no longer increasing housing equity, but more importantly,
are not paying for their consumption of housing services. Since shelter is one of the largest
consumption expense of most households, paying off the mortgage represents a substantial decrease
in income to meet consumption needs for those with wholly-owned housing. We believe that this
argument supports the case for including most of housing wealth when assessing the sufficiency of
assets for retirement.
2. Changes in Wealth Levels Over Time for a Given Age Group
The HRS data presented above gives a detailed snapshot of a specific cohort at one point in
time. Ideally we would prefer a time series of wealth data for the same households, from which we
could assess saving behavior and changes in wealth accumulation. In the future this should be
possible, but thus far we cannot make direct comparisons with the past as there exist no comparable
data either for the identical individuals in the past, or for a similarly-aged cohort at a distant
enough time point in the past.
One way of exploring changes in cohort wealth over time is the approach taken by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1993). This study used data from the Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF) from 1.962 and 1989 to compare wealth of two similarly aged cohorts at two different
points in time: baby boomers born between 1946 and 1964, and their parents. Baby boomers were
then divided into two groups, the first-wave boomers (age 35-44 in 1989), and a second wave born
in the second half of the baby boom (age 25 - 34 in 1989). Those classified as “first wave parents”
were 1962 survey participants age 35-44, and “second wave parents” were those age 25-34 in 1962.
(Households were not intentionally re-sampled in the SCF, so the “parent” group are not the actual
parents of the particular baby boomers in the later survey.)
Median financial wealth figures for baby boomers as well as the parents’ generations are
summarized in Table I.A.4 by income quintile. 7 In the lowest income quintile, baby boomers in
1989 had less wealth than their parents in 1962. The first wave boomers had one-third less wealth,
and the second wave had about half as much accumulated wealth, as their parents at the same age.
In both cases however, the amounts of wealth accumulated are very low. This pattern generally
reverses as we proceed up through the income quintiles. The median younger boomer household
has nearly half again as much accumulated wealth as the median young parent household at the
same age, $9,900 versus $6,700. For the quintile with the highest incomes, younger boomers saved
almost three times as much as their parents at the same point in their lives, $80,800 versus
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$28,000. The conclusions are much the same for the older boomer group, relative to its parents.
The median older boomer household saved nearly 85% more than its parents, $59,500 versus
$32,200. Once again the increase in saving is most dramatic among the highest income quintile
which holds more than twice the wealth of their parents, $184,000 and $89,000, respectively.
One explanation for the wealth increases experienced by baby boomers relative to their
parents is that educational attainment rose substantially across cohorts. The fraction completing
high school rose from three-fifths to four-fifths, and those with four-year college degrees went from
10% of their cohort to nearly one quarter of the later cohort. Those completing college saw median
wealth gains on the order of 50%, while those without high school diplomas saw a drop of some 56%.
Another explanation may be attributable to the relative performance of bond, equity, and real estate
markets in the 1980’s as compared to the 1950’s. The 1980’s was predominately a period of strong
growth for all three asset classes, and returns on the same assets during the 1950’s were not as
robust. Whereas these returns benefited the boomers’ parents just prior to retirement, the pattern
increased wealth for the baby boomers earlier in life, improving their relative position when age is
held constant.
3. The Role of Assumptions in Determining Wealth Values
Survey respondents in the HRS and in other studies probably give as reasonable answers as
can be expected regarding their net financial wealth and housing wealth.8 By contrast, survey
respondents would have a much harder time computing wealth values for contingent sources such
as social security and pensions. Rather than asking people to give wealth values for these, analysts
usually ask respondents their anticipated benefit levels (per month or per year), and then convert
these into expected present value amounts. Of course, the wealth figures thus computed are
sensitive to the underlying assumptions employed in deriving the present value of these flows.
In particular, pension and social security accrual amounts and wealth values are influenced
by assumptions regarding expected future nominal interest rates, inflation rates, and rates of real
wage growth. Raising (lowering) the nominal interest rate decreases (lowers) the wealth value of
future pension and social security benefits. Under current law, social security benefits are indexed
for inflation but private pensions are not, so that raising (decreasing) the assumed inflation rate
decreases (increases) the wealth value of pensions but does not change real social security values.
Raising or lowering the assumed real wage growth correspondingly raises or lowers the wealth
values of social security and pension plans.
7 All figures are expressed in 1992 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to allow for
comparability with the HRS figures.
8 For a discussion of the advantages of the HRS approach in eliciting income values see Gustman
and Juster (1996).
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In the data derived from the HRS and presented thus far, the approach has been to use the
“intermediate” assumptions adopted by the Social Security Administration for purposes of
forecasting future paths of the Social Security Trust Funds through the 75-year projection period
required by Congress. Of course other assumptions could be used in the wealth computations, but
for purposes of comparability, authors such as GMSS (1997) and Mitchell, Olson, Steinmeier (1996)
have tended to rely on these for at least first-round benchmarks.
It is also the case that converting retirement benefit flows into wealth values depends on
assumed mortality rates; GMSS and Mitchell et al. use projected rates based on data supplied by
the Office of the Actuary at the Social Security Administration. These figures could also be
examined to explore their sensitivity; for instance Lee and Skinner (1996) compare demographers’
forecasts with those used by the Social Security Administration and conclude that life expectancy is
probably increasing more quickly than the SSA estimates.
The importance of other assumptions in computing wealth values should also be
highlighted. For instance, many wealth computations assume that the worker retires at the normal
retirement age, say age 65, but in reality many people retire before that point. This could
upwardly bias measured social security and pension wealth.9 Working in the opposite direction is
the fact that social security wealth values assume that benefit formulas currently in effect will still
be in effect at the households retirement date. However the social security system faces potential
insolvency, and it is likely future reforms will substantially alter both the level and the form of
future benefitsl0  In support of the figures given thus far, however, we believe that the HRS data
described above are reasonable for the generation currently on the verge of retirement. It might be
possible to capture the greater uncertainty regarding benefits facing younger generations by using
a higher interest rate to discount the benefit flows,
The bottom line is that different assumptions will change social security and pension wealth
figures somewhat. On the other hand, irrespective of assumptions, these two programs would still
represent the bulk of retirement wealth for the vast majority of US households. Therefore while we
encourage the further use of alternative assumptions to check sensitivity analysis, it is important to
go on to the next step - determining whether these levels are sufficient for retirement.
B. Benchmarks - How do we know How Much is Enough?
In order to determine whether these wealth values are adequate, it is necessary to establish
benchmarks against which household saving can be compared.
g GMSS calculate most of their pension wealth data by projecting service to retirement and then
prorating by service to date. An alternative (that this study also explored) calculates benefits based
on service and salary to date; this would correspond to the current liability of the employer and
produce lower pension wealth values.
lo For a discussion of options see the Final Report of the Technical Panel on Trends in Income and
Retirement Saving (T’IRS 1996) available also on the internet at www.ssa.gov).
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1. The Life Cycle Model -A Theoretical Basis for Evaluation
The traditional economic approach to examining retirement wealth builds on the life cycle
model originally proposed by Modigliani (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Ando and Modigliani
1963) and others. The idea is a simple one, depicted in Figure I.B. 1. Here age is graphed against
dollars, and three profiles are shown. The first line represents earned income: labor earnings are
assumed to grow until retirement age, after which earnings fall substantially. The second line
represents the households consumption stream: if there were no uncertainty about earnings,
mortality, or taxes, the consumption line would be flat. Consumption exceeds earned income during
the early part of the worklife, so that the household must in effect borrow against future income to
finance current consumption. (This would include paying for child rearing expenses, college tuition,
or downpayments on a house). Later in life, the lines cross and consumption becomes less than
earned income; at this point the household pays off past debts and then saves for retirement.
Finally, still later, the lines cross yet again: at retirement, the household now consumes out of
savings to offset cuts in earned income.
In the baseline case with a zero rate of interest, the area under the earned income curve is
exactly equal to the area beneath the consumption curve. More generally, when interest rates are
positive, the area beneath the consumption line exceeds that under the earned income curve,
reflecting returns on accumulated wealth.
Many extensions of this life cycle theory have been suggested, with the most important and
interesting ones exploring how uncertainty affects consumption and saving profiles with age (e.g.
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1994; Deaton 1992, and others). Many sources of uncertainty are
germane, including the fact that people do not know when they will die, they experience
fluctuations in income as they age, they face changes in their health, and they are subject to
fluctuations in asset values and returns.
The third line in Figure I.B. 1 represents the case of consumption when a particular type of
uncertainty enters the picture; here the household does not know life expectancy with certainty.
The effect of this uncertainty is to make the consumption line become humped, rising during the
working years and declining during the retirement years. (In any event it still changes less
drastically with age than does earned income.) This new shape is the result of the household
weighing needed saving to finance future consumption by the probability of living, and comparing
that to the value of wasted consumption due to saving if the household does not survive.
2. Adequacy Benchmarks
While the life cycle model is useful in theory, implementing it in practice proves to be
complex. Many in the financial advisory community suggest computing a number known as the
“replacement rate”, or the ratio of household income needed to finance desired retirement
consumption divided by annual pre-retirement income. The number is a spiritual descendent of life
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cycle theory, but implicitly assumes that post-retirement consumption should be equated to some
fraction of the sum of pre-retirement consumption plus retirement saving. More sophisticated
computations adjust retirement consumption to exclude work related and education expenses (e.g.:
clothing, travel, and related entertainment expenses), and to account for the differential taxation of
workers and retirees.
Empirical efforts to compute retirees’ target replacement rates yield a wide range of
estimates depending on what is included in the computations and which dataset  is used (McGill et
al. 1996). For example, early studies recommended replacement rates declining in income: a
household with $10,000 in annual income would be encouraged to have a replacement rate of 80%
(for an annual retirement income of $SOOO), while the household earning $50,000 before retirement
was encouraged to have a replacement rate of about 55%. More recent work by Palmer (1988,
1991, 1993) updated prior studies to reflect changes in tax law and concludes that gross
replacement rates have varied over time; his results appear in Figure I.B.2. Palmer ‘s results are
problematic in that he argues that replacement rates decline as a function of income in 1991, but
rise with income in 1988 and 1993 for higher income households. Also his results indicate
substantial volatility in recommended replacement rates, a conclusion that makes retirement
planning with the replacement rate datum quite difficult.
A different approach is proposed by Bernheim (1992, 1993, 1994), who works with an
explicit variant of the life cycle model. He models the household as making choices over its lifetime,
facing not only uncertainty over mortality but also shocks to earned income, interest rates, inflation
rates, and even tax rates. His approach assumes that a household seeks to maximize the present
value of its expected utility from future consumption given earnings, net government transfers (i.e.:
social security taxes and benefits), and accumulated wealth in each period. Consumption per period
is the decision variable by which the household optimizes. Since saving is simply income less
consumption, optimal consumption in a period determines saving endogenously.
In this framework, a households saving rate is then determined through dynamic
programming (DP), using a process of backward induction illustrated in Figure I.B.3.” Unlike the
11 In the Bernheim approach, the problem is solved for the last possible period, t = T. Because
there is no further period, at that point the household consumes all its wealth and income. The
same problem is then resolved for period t = T-l allowing for expectations of the final period. In
other words, the household maximizes utility in period T-l in a way that captures the uncertainty of
living to period T. If it were known with certainty that the household survives to the last period
savings would be high, if it were known with certainty that the household would not reach the last
period all assets would be consumed at T-l. Actual savings then weights these two possibilities and
arrives at an intermediate solution which finds a value of CT-I to maximize the problem
max U(CT.I)+~T.I  PU(C’T-1)
where U(C) is the utility of consumption, /3 is the rate of pure time preference (discount) and PT.I is
the probability of surviving from time T- 1 to time T. Once the optimal saving rate is determined for
period t = T-l, the process can be solved for period t = T-2, and in a similar manner for periods back
Mitchell/Moore - Retirement Wealth13
standard replacement rate methodology described previously, the DP approach does not generate
saving rates that are a constant percentage of income; rather, the optimal saving rate path is now
increasing in age up to retirement. Intuitively, this is because as the household ages, its likelihood
of surviving to retirement increases. (An increasing saving rate can be built into the replacement
rate methodology, but the shape of this increase must be determined explicitly whereas for the DP
problem it is a result of the solution methodology and the parameterization of the model.)
Having computed optimal saving rates from the DP model, Bernheim then goes on to
evaluate actual saving patterns reported in a Merrill Lynch survey on household income and
wealth. The results are expressed as an index of savings adequacy; thus a value of 100% would
indicates that workers are saving at exactly the appropriate target pace for retirement under the
Bernheim parameterization of the life cycle model. To sum up the findings, the author reports that
asset accumulation indices fall between 16% (pessimistic assumptions) and 55% (optimistic
assumptions), with his mid-range estimate set at 35%. This scenario anticipates no change in
government benefits and fiscal policy.iz The author concludes:
[E]ven relatively young households (35 to 45 years old) generally need to save 9 to
19% of their after-tax income, and individuals not covered by private pension plans
should be even more frugal. On average, a household in the 35 to 45 age bracket
that does not expect to be covered by a private pension should save between 13% and
25% of after-tax income, and this figure should rise with age. (Bernheim 1993: 1)
It is important to note that Bernheim omits housing wealth in calculating his basic
statistics. This is reasonable, he argues, since retirees generally die in the homes in which they
retire, and surveys indicate that people do not desire to sell housing assets to generate retirement
income. However, in a data appendix the author demonstrates that including housing equity raises
the average adequacy level substantially -to 84%. While this figure is much higher, it still
represents a shortfall.
3. The Importance of Assumptions
It should be evident to the reader that the role of assumptions is critical in determining
whether people have saved ‘enough for retirement. Both the replacement rate (RR) and dynamic
programming (DP) methods just described are powerfully influenced by assumptions regarding
mortality, interest and inflation rates, and retirement ages. Another key issue in the RR method
is how to value a single premium annuity that could be purchased with retirement wealth. Ideally,
a household could purchase such an annuity at an actuarially fair rate and use this annuity flow to
to the starting point. The problem is solved for a number of simulated economies reflecting random
draws in the uncertain variables to give a distribution of optimal saving rates.
12 Results are also supplied assuming that social security is made solvent. Under the most
pessimistic scenario examined in that study, complete elimination of social security benefits, the
midpoint value of saving adequacy is only 9.3%.
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live on in retirement. However, due to sales loads, insurer profits, and adverse selection, this may
be a tenuous assumption and it is discussed in greater detail below.
In using the DP model, still other assumptions take on salience, namely the set of assumed
parameters used to characterize household utility functions. In particular the DP model
emphasizes behavior under uncertainty, so a crucial assumption pertains to the choice of the
households risk aversion parameter. This parameter embodies an assumption about how sensitive a
household will be to fluctuations in its consumption path or permanent income. In general, the
larger the absolute magnitude of the risk aversion parameter, the more sensitive the household will
be to variability and shocks to consumption. More risk averse households will tend to save more in
a precautionary manner, to protect against consumption shortfalls in relatively rare but unpleasant
states of the world.
Another critical parameter in the DP model is the assumed rate of return on accumulated
assets, which reflects the relative price of consuming today versus in the future. A higher rate of
return has two effects: it makes current consumption more expensive (since the consumer gives up
more interest), but it makes current saving more valuable by giving the saver more “bang for his
buck”. For example, $1 saved for a year at 8% buys $1.08 worth of consumption next year (assume
all figures are real); at 10% interest, the corresponding figure is $1.10. But $0.58 saved for 30 years
at 10% buys what $1 saved at 8%. On the other hand, each cent saved does buy that much more in
the future and that may make saving that much more attractive. In general, which effect
dominates in the DP framework is largely determined by the risk aversion parameter.13
Focusing for a moment on the particular choices Bernheim makes to parameterize
important behavioral parameters, it must be concluded that his choices are on the conservative side
- in other words, the assumptions made are consistent with a finding of too little rather than too
much saving. The risk aversion parameter he uses is set to -3, a value at the risk-averse end of
what has been used in the literature. 14 Interest rate values used are drawn from a historical series
of 3 month Treasuries; this too is a conservative assumption, inasmuch as returns on longer
l3 This ambiguity does not exist in the RR model. In the RR model the amount of terminal assets
needed are fixed and higher rates unambiguously lower the necessary saving rate.
14 Bernheim uses a utility function in each period is of the form
(c - rnY
Y
where m is a floor level of consumption (set at $10,000 in 1993 dollars) and y-l is the elasticity of
marginal utility, or similarly, the negative of the coefficient of relative risk aversion R. This
parameter indicates the saver’s sensitivity to consumption fluctuations, with greater values of R
indicating greater desire to smooth consumption patterns through time. Bernheim uses a value of
-3 for y, or R = 4. This is at the high end of values commonly seen in simulation models. The most
commonly observed range is O<R<2, where 0 is linear utility (risk-neutral) and 1 corresponds to
logarithmic utility.
Mitchell/Moore - Retirement Wealth15
maturity Treasuries have historically exceeded those for the short-term instruments.15  This ignores
the still higher returns available on stocks, but as holding stocks means bearing commensurately
more risk, this may not be palatable to a risk-averse investor.
As a result, these two behavioral parameters generate relatively high target savings levels.
Another issue is the fact that Bernheim assumes workers in his DP model retire at the age of 65, so
that they need income for fewer years than reality (actual retirement ages are around 62 in the
US). This would moderate the effects of the previous assumptions. Whether alternative
parameterizations of these key assumptions would yield substantially different results is not
indicated in this study. Bernheim’s figures are also generated only for respondents to the Merrill
Lynch survey, a sample that has subsequently been found to be somewhat wealthier than the
population as a whole.
4. Wealth Accumulation on the Verge of Retirement
In this section we use HRS data to determine whether accumulated wealth is adequate for
retirement in a nationally representative sample of the older population. The results appear in
Table I.B. 1. As prescribed by the replacement rate methodology, we begin with an example
household with characteristics similar to HRS medians. Our household is a married couple with
both husband and wife age 56 in 1992 (the median age for HRS respondents). Total annual
household income is taken to be $46,000, consistent with median values reported by GMSS (1997)
and the present authors. Social Security wealth is taken from Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier
(1996).
The approach we take is to roll forward this median households current total wealth to age
65. A detailed description of how wealth is rolled forward and other procedures can be found in
Moore and Mitchell (1997). In brief what we do is as follows:
i) Net financial wealth is rolled forward assuming assets are held in a portfolio of 60% bonds and
40% stocks, with these assets earning returns consistent with their average real historical
returns over the period 1926.1995.
ii) Net home value computations assume wealth is held in a single owner-occupied house and
housing wealth increases with the increased amortization of the mortgage’s principal. In other
words, zero real appreciation of housing stock is assumed.
iii) Pension wealth is assumed to increase on the presumption that the households pension
allocation consists of one-third defined contribution and two-thirds defined benefit; these are
assumed to grow in line with the rates in GMSS.
l5 For example, the spread between the yields on 3 month and 30 year Treasuries was
approximately 150 basis points in February 1997 (CNN Financial Network 2121197).
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iv) Social security wealth increases are based on the differences between current value and the
projected value for a married couple as calculated in Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (1996)
using actual earnings profiles.
The projected value of current assets at age 65 is $445,300. (See Table I.B. 1.)
Given the projection of household wealth at age 65, the next step is to determine household
needs in retirement. Here we express need as the wealth level required to generate income
consistent with a specified pre-retirement income replacement rate. On the presumption that real
income (of $46,000 in 1992 dollars) is constant to age 65, we seek to determine how to finance
consumption at any given fraction of $46,000 per year in retirement. Results are presented under
replacement rate assumptions of both 70% and 80%. Based on prior studies, as summarized in
Figure I.B.2, these are reasonable bounds on the suggested replacement rates for a household of
this income level.
For each of the two replacement rates, values are calculated under three alternative real
discount rate scenarios and two annuity assumptions. The baseline real discount rate scenario is
2.5%, corresponding to the 70.year average of real returns on long-term government bonds. This is
bounded by a conservative assumption of 1% and a more aggressive assumption of 4% (real).
Needed wealth values are calculated under two annuity assumptions - 100% joint and survivor
annuity, that presumes the surviving spouse needs the same income after a partner’s death as
when both partners were alive, and a 50% joint and survivor annuity, that assumes income needs
are halved when one spouse dies. Actual need likely lies somewhere between these two values,
inasmuch as some expenditures such as housing probably do not decrease, while others such as
food, travel expenditures, and clothing would decline.
Having computed the amount needed to sustain consumption, we subtract the projected
value of the median households current assets. The shortfall reflects the additional wealth
required to meet retirement need. Consequently we compute how much the household would need
to amortize this shortfall by its retirement date, calculated assuming level savings and returns
commensurate with a portfolio of 40% stocks and 60% bonds.
It will be noted from Table I.B.2. that the resulting saving rates span a wide range under
the baseline interest rate assumption -from a high of 39% of annual income (i.e. $17,800 per year),
to a low of 1% of income (i.e. $500 annually). In our judgment the mid-range value of 23% of
income) is probably more in keeping with what the median household might consider; this assumes
a 70% replacement rate with a 100% survivor benefit. A lower 14% saving rate is achievable with
an 80% replacement with 50% survivor benefit, and probably represents a lower bound on required
household saving.
As we move from the baseline interest rate assumption the range of prescriptions becomes
even wider. With a very conservative interest rate and annuity assumption, the methodology
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would mandate that the median household would have to save nearly two-thirds (63%) of annual
income until retirement, a target not sustainable by most. Under the more aggressive assumptions
the median household need save nothing beyond its current assets. This range illustrates how
sensitive saving advice is to underlying assumptions, even given a relatively short planning
horizon.
It is interesting to compare our results to the saving prescriptions offered by Bernheim
(1994) using the DP methodology. Bernheim’s approach advises an after-tax saving rate of 19% for
a 55 year-old married couple having traditional pensions and an annual household income of
$50,000. Surprisingly, his number is at the low end of our estimated range as required rates from
pre-tax income would be lower than those from after-tax income. However the discrepancy can be
reconciled by noting that the “on-track” hypothetical couple in Bernheim’s world holds
approximately $90,000 of retirement wealth. Using our own HRS sample, we find that the median
couple holds one-third less financial wealth in reality - only $59,300 - so the median HRS
household would need to undertake additional saving using both approaches.
While these figures do suggest assets are inadequate to cover pre-retirement consumption
levels, it might be asked whether using other criteria would produce better results. Table I.B.3.
compares annuitized consumption flows with poverty line level spending, and a somewhat mixed
picture emerges. Less than 5% of the respondents overall were at risk of falling into poverty in
retirement. This risk is concentrated among blacks and single-person households who were far
more likely to have inadequate income levels to bring them over the poverty line.
5. Conclusion
In this section we have shows that there is a great deal of evidence regarding the adequacy
of retirement saving. However analysts have suggested a wide range of different benchmarks, and
there is no single and simple “right” benchmark applicable to all people in every circumstance. At
first glance, the evidence from the HRS would seem to indicate that on average those near
retirement are in a relatively comfortable position, once social security benefits and pensions are
included. Nevertheless, when we project these assets to retirement age and compare them to an
income-related benchmark, even the median household faces a large saving task ahead. Whether
this is feasible will be taken up in the next section.
It is also important to remember that our calculations for the median older household mask
a great deal of diversity in the older population taken as a whole. In today’s world, older
households that are white, have higher income, are highly educated, and are married generally
appear relatively better prepared for retirement. In contrast, poorly educated, low income,
nonwhite households may be in far worse shape.
What the future will hold for the baby boomers - people today 10 or more years from
retirement - is somewhat less clear. If this cohort continues saving at rates faster than their
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parents did, they may be in good shape. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that today’s
workers will benefit from the windfall runup in assets that recent history bestowed on their
parents. The baby boom also confronts greater uncertainty in social security and pension benefits;
and the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pension plans will probably push more
responsibility for their own welfare onto baby boom households. All in all, it seems clear that the
baby boom cohort is not experiencing a dramatic saving shortfall that some doom mongers have
portended. On the other hand they would be prudent to save more than they are, and relatively
modest changes in saving patterns today may avert the need for drastic changes tomorrow.
C. Incentives and Disincentives for Saving
If we take as given that households tend to save too little for retirement, the next question is
why and what might be done to rectify the situation.
1. Why Might Households be Saving too Little?
One potential explanation for why households save too little is that some people simply
might not be able to aIYord to save. This might be true, for instance, if income barely covers a
subsistence level of consumption. However this view is not likely to hold for other than the poorest
of the poor in the US.
A second possible explanation for undersaving focuses on the inherent difficulty solving of
the households planning problem. As can be seen from the discussion of the DP model above, many
issues must be considered and assumptions made about inherently uncertain future variables
including future income streams, interest rates to be earned on various asset classes, tax rates and
issues, future inflation rates, and mortality. Also, as demonstrated earlier, calculated saving rates
are quite sensitive to changes in assumptions, and experts may not agree on what these
assumptions should be.
Few experts have actually tried to evaluate whether people seem able to forecast the future
particularly accurately. Of note are Bernheim’s (1996) study assessing financial literacy and Hurd
and McGarry’s (1995) analysis of subjective mortality assessments. Bernheim finds households
generally lacking in financial knowledge, and he ties this financial illiteracy to under-preparation for
retirement. Inasmuch as saving rates are an increasing function of financial and economic literacy,
he concludes that such ignorance may be depressing saving rates. The work by Hurd and McGarry
finds that people can predict fairly accurately the likelihood of surviving to age 75, but they tend to
overestimate the probability of living to 85. This suggests that people should tend to oversave
rather than undersave, so the evidence is not supportive of the undersaving hypothesis.
Another rationale for too little saving may be lack of self control (Thaler 1994; Sheffrin and
Thaler 1988). This theory contends that people face a conflict between a desire for immediate
gratification versus a forward-looking need to save for the future. The psychological perspective
asserts that people develop so-called “mental accounts”, and treat money differently depending on
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which account it is attached to. Thus some income surprises tend to be consumed immediately,
while others tend to be saved for future consumption. Thaler argues that to increase saving, people
need to have funds deposited automatically through payroll deductions or mandatory saving of tax
refunds.
Another potential explanation for undersaving patterns relies more on incentives rather
than psychological constructs. This approach emphasizes the role of government in providing an
income safety net, which various authors have argued discourages precautionary saving (Gokhale,
Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus 1996; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1994, 1995). Specifically, a wide
range of government programs for the elderly is seen to have provided them with longevity
insurance. No longer worried about living beyond their income (in the case of social security), or
paying catastrophic medical costs (in the case of Medicare and Medicaid), the elderly rationally can
view such government programs as curtailing the need for households to save. This is particularly
relevant given asset tests for programs such as Medicaid nursing home support, where older
persons must first exhaust their own funds before seeking government assistance.16 The logical
extension of this behavior is that households expecting to use these services will increasingly tend
not to save at all; those who are wealthy must save more since for them, since the possibility of
government assistance is remote. This pattern will then exacerbate the resulting inequality in
accumulated wealth.
In sum, analysts have offered many different explanations for low saving rates. The
relative importance of each of these reasons - lack of substantial income, poor understanding of
financial and related issues, psychological issues, or the unintended influences of government
programs - is unclear. Most of these reasons have sound basis in economic theory but have been
relatively untested empirically. As good data become available it will be possible to investigate
these hypotheses.
2. Do Tax Inducements for Saving Work?
An important feature of most dedicated retirement saving programs is the advantaged tax
status they provide for saving. Income saved through these programs reduces taxable income in the
year saved. In addition, capital gains, dividends, and interest payments, are not taxed as they
accumulate. Taxes are paid when the assets are withdrawn. By the time they are withdrawn, the
saver is generally in retirement and hence in a lower tax bracket. The tax deferral mechanism
therefore effectively raises the after-tax rate of return on these assets.
16 In some cases this has led to some elderly transferring assets to their children or other relatives
to meet asset tests and to avoid spending their own money on long term care when they can take
advantage of the government ‘s largesse. In response to these actions states have recently initiated
tests governing asset transfers to minimize gaming of the system. Eligibility is now a function not
only of the elderly individual’s current assets but also past assets over a three year period.
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This observation raises two important research questions for researchers concerned with
saving behavior and public policy. The first is whether this tax inducement raises saving rates.
The incentives are certainly intended to induce households to save more, but some believe that all
that happens is that saving is just shifted from taxed to tax-deferred vehicles. The second question
is whether the increase in saving generated by these tax incentives justifies the foregone tax
revenue that it costs.
The literature on this subject is long and the arguments contentious. Early work by
Feldstein (1977), Diamond and Hausman (1980) and Munnell(1982), examined how defined benefit
pension plans influenced saving. These studies assumed that participants in defined benefit plans
see the promised deferred benefit is effectively an exchange for reduced wages. Employees are
saving indirectly through the employer-provided plan. Empirical estimates of this tradeoff
suggested that private, nonpension, saving fell by between 32 and 42 cents per dollar saved through
a defined benefit plan. This is analogous to looking at the proverbial glass as half empty. A more
positive view is defined benefit plans raise aggregate saving. Every dollar saved through a tax-
protected dedicated retirement vehicle would be predicted to raise aggregate saving by 58 to 68
cents.
Subsequent studies have been numerous, many of them examining how changes in the tax
code affected defined benefit pension values especially for employees with high salaries, and also
how tax law changes affected employers’ ability to prefund for promised benefits. While discussion
of these specific changes are beyond the scope of this paper (the interested reader is referred to
McGill et al. 1996), these changes have been important to providers of defined benefit pension
plans, and may explain why so few employers are offering the DB plan type when designing new
plans.
A very active line of recent research has focused on the saving effects of define contribution
pensions, in particular Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA ‘s) and 401(k) plans. IRA ‘s were first
allowed in 1974, to provide a tax-preferred saving mechanism for those individuals with no
company-sponsored pension plan. Rules governing these plans were then loosened by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, expanding IRA eligibility to most American households and raising
contribution limits. Shortly thereafter the rules were again tightened. In 1986, the Tax Reform Act
limited higher-income households’ tax deductible contributions to these plans. Coincident with
these changes, and probably largely because of them, IRA contributions see-sawed from $5 billion in
1981, rising to $38 billion in 1986, and then fell to less than $8 billion in 1994 (Hubbard and
Skinner 1996).
Over the same time period 401(k) plans saw tremendous growth. The tax advantages of
401(k) s mirror those of IRA ‘s, but there are important differences. The most important of these
are that 4010s are employer sponsored and are tied to employment, and employers can match
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employee contributions in a tax protected way, subject to certain rules and regulations. According
to Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996c), contributions to 401(k) grew from almost zero in 1981 to more
than $63 billion in 1992. Figure I.C. 1. illustrates the relative growth of 401(k) plans versus all
other employer-provided plans over the period 1984 to 1992. Contributions to 401(k)‘s soared from
18% to 50% of all pension contributions. This enabled total pension assets attributable to 401Q’s to
rise from less than 9% to more than 26%. In this period, participants covered by 4Ol(k)‘s rose from
about 12% to nearly 35% of employees with sponsored pension plans.
The question of central importance for our purposes is whether these IRA and 401(k)
contributions represent new saving, and if so, how much? One group of researchers contends that
these contributions represent considerable new savings (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 1993, 1996a,
1996b, 1996c). In a series of studies this team concludes that between 45 and 66 cents per dollar
contributed to an IRA represents new saving, deposited at the expense of current consumption. The
balance, between 34 and 55 cents, comes from the tax subsidy and reallocation of existing saving.
The evidence is more equivocal for 401(k) contributions, mainly because of the difficulty researchers
have had in obtaining good data indicating how employer match provisions work in available
datafiles. Also, some 401(k) plans replace terminated defined benefit plans and represent a transfer
from one saving mechanism to another, rather than new saving. In all, though, when Poterba et al.
compare the saving behavior of households with 401(k) plans to those without, they conclude that
both types of households have non-pension saving that is quite similar. From this and other
evidence, they deduce that the bulk of 401(k) saving is new saving.
Opposing this group is another research team arguing that most IRA and 401(k)
contributions are financed through tax savings and shifting of saving from taxed vehicles to tax-
favored vehicles, and not from reductions in current consumption (Gale and Scholz 1994; Engen,
Gale, and Scholz 1996). Considering a scenario where the IRA contribution limit is raised by $1000
(from $2000 to $3000), Gale and Scholz conclude that only two cents per dollar of additional
contributions would represent new saving. This assumes all of the households tax reduction is
saved; were some of the tax saving used for current consumption, then they would argue that IRA ‘s
stimulate no new saving (and might even reduce it). Their findings for 401(k) plans are of a similar
nature.
Who is right? In a pair of excellent recent critiques, Bernheim (1996) and Hubbard and
Skinner (1996) review the methodology, highlight data difficulties common to both studies, point out
problems unique to each of the authors ‘ studies, and draw out key sensitivities to specific
assumptions and estimation techniques. Both reviews come to the same conclusion: the optimistic
studies likely overstate net additions to saving derived from tax incentives, and the pessimistic
studies likely sell the programs short. A mid-range figure 26 cents per dollar of contributions is
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suggested as a conservative but reasonable estimate of the new saving generated by new IRA
contributions (Hubbard and Skinner 1996).
Whether an increase in saving of this magnitude justifies the cost in foregone taxes is a
complex matter. To evaluate it, Hubbard and Skinner calculate the ratio of the change in private
capital accumulation per dollar of IRA contributions to the change in net tax revenue per dollar of
IRA contribution. This ratio indicates the amount of saving generated per dollar of tax subsidy and
is calculated under three scenarios. Under the first and baseline scenario using the 26 cents figure
and tax laws in place in the mid-1980’s, each dollar of tax subsidy generates $2.21 in increased
saving. The second scenario allows for secondary effects that the supply of IRA funds to
corporations indirectly generate in income and corporate taxes. Under these revised assumptions,
each dollar of tax subsidy generates $4.84 in increased saving. The third scenario recalculates the
figure using current tax laws and obtains a result of $2.09 in new saving for dollar lost in tax
revenue.
Despite the range of opinion regarding the saving stimuli associated with these programs
the general tone of the results is encouraging. That is, if IRA contribution limits were to be raised,
it indicates that there would be a surge of new saving through IRA’s. The variance in opinion,
however, underscores the need for additional research in this arena and application of statistical
methods to new and varied data sets.
3. Pension Plan Design and Participant Education
Those covered by a company-sponsored 401(k) plan face encouragement to save via the
contribution match made by the sponsoring employer. Matches are restricted by law but vary
widely in practice. For example, employers are not obligated to offer a match, but might match half
of employee contributions up to a specified contribution limit. Total employee contributions are
limited to the lesser of 15% of compensation or the government contribution limits, unless the
sponsor sets a lower limit. Caps on matches are generally determined so that the plan does not
violate discrimination rules requiring that highly paid employees do not enjoy disproportionate
gains from the plan relative to more modestly paid individuals.
Most analyses of household saving behavior undertaken by economists use large cross
section data sets such as the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) or the Current Population Survey
(CPS). In analyzing 401(k) contribution behavior these surveys have the common problem that they
lack key information on the specifics of employer-sponsored plans. Therefore users of these data
sets to explore 401(k) saving behavior have to make assumptions about employer matches, for
instance using average match values from some other source. Imputation of match values in this
way can mask the importance of these matches and may lead to biased or even incorrect results. A
different but equally critical problem is these data sets do not follow the same households over a
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number of time periods. This makes it impossible to examine changes in 401(k) saving behavior
among the same households over time.
To address the role of employer match rates, analysts have turned to 401(k) plan
administrators seeking more detailed data from employee records. One such study examined
contribution behavior in a 401(k) plan sponsored by a medium-sized manufacturing firm over the
five years between 1987 and 1991 (Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox 1994). During this time, the
employer match rate changed annually, but employees demonstrated practically no sensitivity to
these changes in match rates. In fact, it appeared that employees effectively went on “auto-pilot”.
Three-fourths of those eligible to participate either did not contribute, contributed up to the point
where the employer would no longer match contributions, or contributed to the maximum degree
the plan would allow. Once a contribution rate was set, it did not change.
Studies such as this one are informative as case study explorations of individual plans, but
their results cannot be extrapolated to draw a bigger pictures of the 401(k) world. Is the behavior of
the firm examined unique, or is it representative of common behavior? For example, while they
may paint an accurate picture of behavior in medium-sized manufacturers, what could we infer for
a large bank with a more heterogeneous employee mix? A richer data set with information on 19
firms ranging in size from 700 to 10,000 employees is explored by Clark and Scheiber (1996).
Although the data are drawn from a single year, inferences on sensitivity to match rates can be
drawn from the variety offered across plans assuming individuals behave similarly. The authors
observe that participation rates are an increasing function of match rates:
lR]elative to being in a plan with a 25 percent match rate, a worker covered by a
plan with a 50 to 75 percent match rate is 28 percentage points more likely to
participate in the 401(k) plan. Workers in plans with a 100 percent match rate are
47 percentage points more likely to make an annual contribution to the plan than
those in a plan with only a 25 percent match rate. (Clark and Scheiber 1996: 15)
Higher match rates also stimulate greater contributions among those who do contribute; specifically
pension contribution rates for those with 100% matches are two percent of salary higher than for
those receiving a 25% match. Using a database from the 1993-94 KPMG Peat Marwick Retirement
Benefits Survey, Bayer et al. (1996) also conclude that plans with matches have higher
participation rates -by 15 to 17 percentage points - than do plans without matches.
A merent but related issue is how pension plan participants respond to employer efforts to
educate them about retirement saving and their particular plans. Clark and Schieber find that
providing specifically tailored communication about a plan has much the same impact as does
raising employer match rates from 25 to 100% as illustrated in Figure I.C.2.
Bayer et al. explore which types of firms offer employee education programs, as a function of
the plan types offered, unionization, employer matches, investment options, loan features, and
participation rates. They conclude that seminars are more likely in larger firms and when a
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company has multiple plans, and less likely in unionized plans. The results indicate that education
increases participation and contribution rates, and the effect is strongest among non-highly
compensated employees as illustrated in Table I.C.2. The increase in participation rates for non-
highly compensated employees (NHCE’s) is about twice that for highly compensated employees
@ICE’s),  12.1% versus 6.6%. Contribution rates increase about 1% for NHCE’s following seminars,
but have no material impact on contribution rates for HCE’s. These results are significantly
stronger for seminars than for written plan materials, and frequent seminars increase participation
significantly.
The importance of educating employees about their pension plan is corroborated by
Bernheim and Garrett (1996) who use a 1994 Merrill Lynch survey of some 2,000 households. Here
the authors explore the link between wealth and savings rates and various other characteristics of
the respondents. Median regressions are used to alleviate the skewness in wealth distributions
described above. What they find is that when retirement education is offered, it is strongly related
to retirement wealth and savings flows, although not to respondents’ total net worth. In addition,
these education effects are more pronounced for those saving very little to begin with. Specifically,
where education is provided, median 401(k) balances in pension plans are greater than where it is
not ($8250 vs. $5000). The differential outcome is even greater when employees are divided
according to whether they actually attended the educational sessions ($10,000 vs. $4000). Not only
are balances higher; there is also a positive relationship between use of educational material and
probability of 401(k) usage, such that those partaking of the pension education have 12% higher
participation rates in the 401(k) plan.
The nature of Bernheim and Garrett ‘s database allows them to assess the spillover effects
on other saving. Availability of retirement education increases overall saving by 1.65 percent,
greater than the approximate one percent increase in targeted retirement saving. This indicates
that education provides wholesale changes in saving behavior and not just small changes at the
margin.
4. Conclusion
Although economists are just beginning to understand why people do not save adequately
for retirement, it appears that there are some mechanisms at our disposal to improve matters. Tax
inducements via IRA’s, 4Ol(k)‘s, and other programs do seem to help, though there is still dispute
about the precise degree to which they help. Recent changes to IRA contribution limits increasing
deductibility for couples and proposals by the Administration to further raise contribution limits
would provide natural experiments to help sort out the value of these deductions. Also of note is a
pending bill to increase peoples’ ability to borrow from their pension plan for needs such as
mortgage down payments or college tuition. If implemented, allowing limited pre-59 ‘/
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withdrawals may ease liquidity concerns among some households and hence increase saving (of
course it also might lower eventual retirement balances).
The impact of employer sponsored financial education programs appears to be quite positive.
The studies summarized here show that education has strong savings inducements especially
among those plan participants with lower incomes, and these are precisely the households that need
to be spurred on the most. We also find that the saving increases spill over to accounts outside of
the employers direct sphere of influence. Education is seen to be a substitute for employer
matching contributions. Therefore it may be more cost effective for employers to induce employee
participation and contributions to plans by actively providing education.
There are two potential negatives associated with employer education. The first is coverage.
A significant fraction of the workforce is not currently covered by employer sponsored plans. This is
the population segment that arguably most needs financial education but there are no apparent
benefits to these employers for providing it. The second negative is the threat of fiduciary liability;
companies providing financial education take on some risk of participant complaints in the event of
investment shortfalls. The legal issues surrounding this point are still under litigation, suggesting
that employers will proceed cautiously on the financial education front.
It is important to note that both of the mechanisms just described address the symptoms of
undersaving but not the underlying problem. Further study of the causes is warranted. It is likely
that there is no singular driving factor, but that different households do not save for different and,
possibly, individual reasons. Research into why people do not save and the variance in saving
profiles should be a foremost priority.
II. Asset Management Prior to Retirement
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Having described the asset accumulation procedure, the next question is how people invest
their assets intended for retirement. In this section we explore a range of views on how investors
should think about managing their portfolios prior to retirement, and in the next section we
examine relevant data on how people actually manage their retirement saving. We show that - not
surprisingly -there is a wide range of opinion regarding what asset allocation goals should be, and
experts do not agree on what the optimal rule for allocation of retirement portfolios.
A. Retirement Asset Allocation Goals
A great deal of investment advice is proffered to investors by the large and growing industry
of financial advice-givers. This group generally advises conservative investors to hold the majority
of their assets in bonds, while aggressive investors are encouraged to hold stock. Four such
recommendations appear in Table 1I.A. 1, ranging from Fidelity Investments (a large mutual fund
company), Merrill Lynch (a large brokerage firm), Jane Bryant Quinn (a financial columnist), to the
financial section of the New York Times (Canner et al. 1994).
Averaging the advice from these four representatives of the financial community reveals
that investment advice offered varies with investor risk aversion. Should the investor believe
himself to be risk averse or conservative, he is advised to hold about a third of his portfolio in bonds
and another third in cash (or short term money market funds). This conservative investor would
therefore have only about 30% of his funds remaining to invest in stocks. If the willingness to take
on risk is higher, the investor is advised to hold more stock. Thus after consulting financial
advisers, a moderately risk-averse individual would be expected to hold about 40% in stock, and an
“aggressive” individual advised to hold 80% or more in stocks.
It is interesting that these asset allocation recommendations accord closely with Siegel’s
(1995:299)  proposal that the optimal portfolio of a conservative investor should consist of 25% stock,
a moderate investor’s should include 50% stocks, and a risk-taking investor’s holdings should be
95% stock. But Siegel argues that this recipe is “best” for investors with only a single year time
horizon; since people saving for retirement have a far longer holding period than a single year, he
argues that a better long term allocation would be much more concentrated in stock. Even a
conservative investor planning on holding the assets for 10 years is advised to hold 40% in stock,
and if more than 30 years, he advises 72% in stock. The aggressive investor contemplating either a
lo-year or a 30-year holding period is counseled to place more than 100% of investable funds in
stock (borrowing against other assets to achieve this goal). Siegel’s conclusion flows from his view
that, in the long run, bonds and money market funds are likely to lose value due to inflation and be
dominated by higher stock returns.
Notwithstanding the popularity of the advice that long-horizon investors should hold stock,
some in the research community take issue with it. One concern is that people tend not to know
whether they are conservative or aggressive investors, leading investment advisers to offer
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questionnaires that seek to elicit risk preferences (and ability to bear risk; see Halhnan and
Rosenbloom 1993). A simple solution is to link some simple observable characteristic about the
investor - such as age - to (unobserved) risk preferences. This is usually the thesis behind the
prescription that young people should invest in stocks, presuming that they have a longer time
horizon and thus should be more tolerant of risk. One proponent of this view is Burton Malkiel,
(1996: 411) who favors “more common stocks for individuals early in the life cycle and more bonds
for those nearer to retirement”.
The view that stocks are a better investment for the young is also challenged by a
distinguished group led by Nobel-prize winner Paul Samuelson (1994) who argues that the decision
to hold stocks versus bonds depends on a complex set of assumptions about the capital market as
well as other assets the investor holds. In a recent review of the arguments, Canner et al (1994)
concluded that in a world with a simple CAPM model, the optimal rule is for “all investors [to] hold
risky assets in the same proportions” (p. 5; see also Jagannathan and Kocherlakota, 1996). In
particular, all investors would be predicted to hold bonds to stocks in constant ratio of 0.3
throughout their lives and adjust portfolios to suit risk tolerance by adjusting the relative holdings
of this stock-bond portfolio with cash holdings. This is a very different prescription than the
fractions proposed in Table 1I.A. 1.
One reason financial advisors tend to deviate from the CAPM golden lifetime ratio of stocks
to bonds is that risk averse investors are unwilling to face a 1929-type  stock market crash. That is,
even though in the long run investors might make more money holding a large fraction of stocks,
this much stock exposes them to a potentially large loss of the type that would wipe them out. It
simply might not be possible to borrow enough against the future in order to survive in the short
run (Bodie 1995).
Another reason to deviate from the simple CAPM model’s prescription is because people
hold a great deal of their wealth in human capital rather than physical capital, particularly when
they are young. So when deciding how to invest financial assets, what becomes critical is the
anticipated future correlation between labor earnings and capital returns as well as the worker’s
remaining work life. If bonds were more closely correlated with salaries than stocks, for instance,
then a young worker would hold more of his financial capital in stocks to offset earnings risk.
Later in life when a worker’s human capital was exhausted, he would reasonably switch to a
portfolio heavier in bonds (Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson, 1992).
In sum, there are strong differences of opinion across financial advisers regarding what
should be the desired level of equities, bonds, and other assets in peoples’ portfolios. What is
interesting is that after a great deal of research, it appears that the “folk wisdom” offered by
financial advisers but rejected by some academics may now be revived. That is, though controversy
lingers, the current view seems to be that stocks should be favored in retirement portfolios by
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younger people, and bonds by older people, at least for those whose earnings are correlated with
bonds (Jagannathan and Kocherlakota, 1996).
Despite this conclusion, however, a great deal more research remains to be done to fine-tune
asset allocation suggestions. In particular, advisers must begin by measuring and then taking into
account other co-movements between earnings and returns on a wider range of capital flows
workers receive. In this process we need to learn more about desired asset mixes in more complex
circumstances. For example the asset allocation needs of a married couple where each works in a
different industry and faces different retirement ages are likely to differ from those of a single
individual; as Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) have shown, risk sharing within the family can be quite
powerful. Similarly, the implications of risk sharing across generations should be explored in more
depth, where for example an anticipated bequest of a parental home could influence the adult
child’s desired asset allocation. Asset allocation patterns should also be devised to take into account
liquidity needs that occur at predictable times - such as for children’s college tuition. And as a final
example, 401(k) retirement portfolio allocation decisions might differ a worker with no other
financial assets, versus a second worker with a large defined benefit plan and a house. Research on
these extensions has only begun.
B. How Do People Actually Invest their Retirement Assets?
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Having explored some of the practical and theoretical advice offered to investors, the next
issue we tackle is how people actually invest their retirement assets. The question might be asked
whether people seem to follow advice from the investor community, and if so, whether it influences
their investment allocations.
Above we noted the fact that there is some controversy over what is, and what is not,
properly counted as retirement assets -for instance researchers disagree over whether owner-
occupied housing should be counted as retirement assets or not. In any event, for all but the
wealthiest households, net financial assets other than housing are so low as to be virtually
uninteresting from the point of view of examining asset allocation patterns. That is, despite the fact
that the HRS cohort is on the verge of retirement, the bottom 20% of the earnings distribution has
accumulated virtually nothing in the way of net financial assets (excluding housing) -- $3,000. At
higher income levels, nonhousing wealth rises, but to only $18,000 for the second quintile, to
$41,000 for the third quintile, and still only $68,000 for people earning in the fourth quartile (Table
1I.B. 1). Only in the top-earning quintile do the net financial holdings other than housing cross the
hundred-thousand dollar threshold, for a median value of $165,000. These figures do not include
company-sponsored pension values, but do incorporate dedicated retirement accounts like IRA’s and
Keogh plans. As Table 1I.B. 1 shows, however, such dedicated retirement accounts have a median
value of zero or close to zero for all but the highest earnings group, where even there the total
accumulation is only $15,000.
Because of the fact that net financial assets other than housing accumulations are so low
even among the population closest to retirement, it is more productive to turn to an examination of
company-sponsored pension accumulations to examine retirement asset allocation patterns. In this
context, it is necessary to distinguish between defined benefit plans, where employers normally
have the sole responsibility and control over asset allocation decisions, and defined contribution
plans, where participants are normally able to influence the way their accounts are invested.
It has long been conventional wisdom that defined benefit pension plans tend to hold far
more of their portfolio in equities than do defined contribution pension plans, perhaps because of
the expectation that individual participants are more risk averse than are group pension trustees.
However a glance at Table II.B.2 indicates how wrong this common perception is, as evidenced in
several recent studies on pension fund holdings. Specifically, assets held in large single-employer
defined benefit pension plans are about half in equities, a fraction not very different from the
current holdings of defined contribution plans. Of course, the figures depend somewhat on when
the data were collected and by which group: for instance, a Greenwich Associates survey of large
corporate pension plans found equities amounted to 47% of private defined contribution pension
holdings and 57% of the defined benefit funds in 1993, while a 1996 survey of the top 1000 corporate
plans by Williams (1997) found the DB/DC equity fractions more similar, at 48% and 53%,
Mitchell/Moore - Retirement Wealth30
respectively. Nonetheless the message is one of similarities rather than discrepancies: equities rose
and fixed income holdings fell, with 33% of defined benefit assets and 30% of defined contribution
plan assets in bonds and other fixed income holdings in the most recent data.
Based on this findings it seems that excessive conservatism among defined contribution
investors is currently not a matter for substantial concern. Overall, in fact, the results suggest that
defined contribution asset allocation patterns are roughly consistent with those suggested by the
financial press for the moderately risk averse investor described above. One reason that this might
be true now, thought it was less true in the past, is that participants in defined contribution pension
plans have moved away from guaranteed investment contracts over time. Thus between 1990-1996,
GIC representation fell from 29% to 21% of defined contribution assets (Williams 1997). Another
reason for the higher-than-anticipated current concentration of stocks in defined contribution
pension portfolios is that “[a]s the stock market rises, participants don’t necessarily rebalance their
401(k) asset allocations the way pension executives rebalance defined benefit plan allocations”
(Williams 1997: 1). This suspicion is confirmed with a glance at the EBRI figures in the table: in
1983 the typical large DC pension held 39% of the fund in equities and a decade later the fraction
had risen to 45%; similar patterns hold true for the Wilhams data. By contrast DB equity holdings
either held constant or fell slightly, according to the EBRI and Williams survey information.
A more detailed investigation of this conclusion is warranted since averages conceal
important details. For example, knowing whether asset allocation patterns differ across the
population according to sociodemographic traits might be a first step toward asking whether these
patterns are intentional or accidental.
Preliminary information on this is provided in a study by Schieber and Goodfellow(l995),
who draw on a datafile covering 24 large private employers with pension plans covering 36,000
employees. The results in Table II.B.3 reveal that 401(k) asset allocation patterns change with plan
participant age rather dramatically. For instance, workers over age 60 hold little of their
retirement portfolio in equities - under 15% -while people younger than 40 buy stock or stock
funds with close to half of their 401(k) money. The all-employee average for the sample was 34% of
assets held in stock, including stock funds, company stock, and international stock funds. (These
percentages are exclusive of stocks held in balanced funds since there are no data to back out stock
holdings in these plans.) The overall inverse relation between age and equity holding suggests less
risk aversion among the younger population, though even people in their 40’s were found to hold as
much as 40% in equities in their 401(k) plan, Conversely, assets held in futed-income investments
rose from about 40% for people in their 20’s, to more than double that for people over age 60. In
other words these data indicate asset allocations vary by age in the direction predicted by the
theoretical approaches to asset allocation identified in the previous section.
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Another way to examine the asset allocation decision asks how investment strategies change
with participant earnings, a pattern indicated in the second panel of Table II.B.3. The data show
that the average employee devotes half his pension contribution to stock funds, or as much as 60%
on equities if the other two stock categories are included. Interestingly, those earning up to $60,000
put at least half of their investments in balanced income funds; only those in top brackets (earnings
> $6OK) invest less than half of their money in the balanced fund (and instead emphasize pure
equity funds). Fixed income holdings represent a relatively small portfolio fraction, never above
20%, but rise with pay. The low-paid group is less likely to invest in any form of corporate stock
than higher paid people, yet the lower-wage group still devotes a third of the portfolio or more to
stock. Of course, this might be perfectly in line with the notion outlined earlier - that high earners
buy equities early in life and bonds later to offset depreciating human capital, while low earners
would have no particular reason to buy equities to offset human capital risk.
A different cut on the data is to look at asset allocation patterns by sex, which differ rather
sharply by economic sector, as depicted in Tables II.B.4 and 5. The information in Table II.B.4 is
drawn from a recent survey of 401Q plan participants who were employees of large firms operating
across a range of different industries. These data are nonrepresentative of workers in smaller
firms, but no better data on asset allocation practices in private plans are available by sex. It is
interesting to observe that in this survey, at least, women and men seem to behave quite similarly:
pension accumulations as well as new contributions devoted to equities stood at about 50%, and
fixed income amounts at about 40-45%,  for both sexes. In other words, this survey suggests that
plan participants in the private sector 401(k) pensions are following the “moderate investor” advice
recommended in Table 1I.B. f quite faithfully.
A quite different pattern is evident in a recent survey of asset allocation patterns by sex
among Federal Government employees investing their Thrift Saving Plan holdings. Q’he TSP plan
is similar to the 401(k) offering available to private sector employees). In the TSP, all employees are
required to hold some funds in the government securities fund [G], but may elect the fraction of
funds invested in the stock and/or the bond index funds offered. In 1994, the data show that only
28% of the women versus 45% of the men opted for the equity index fund, and women held only 9%
of their assets in the equity fund (versus 15% of men’s assets). Women in the TSP also were slow to
move into the bond fund: 12 percent versus 20% of the men had chosen to invest in the bond fund.
Women’s reluctance to diversify out of the G fund lead Hinz and Turner (forthcoming) to estimate
that men would end up with retirement portfolios worth four to 16 percentage points more than
similar women (simply as a result of having invested in lower-return, lower-risk holdings - See
Table II.B.6.). One question that has yet to be addressed is why both male and female Federal
sector employees are less likely to buy equities with their pension contributions than do their
private sector counterparts. A second issue is why women in the Federal sector appear to be more
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conservative investors, across plans. It is possible that Federal employees’ total compensation is
more correlated with stock returns than the average private sector employee - and female civil
servants’ pay is even more correlated thus -but this seems doubtful. Alternatively the Federal
sector may attract more risk-averse workers, particularly among women, than average. Both
hypotheses could be tested given the right dataset.
C. Factors Influencing Asset Allocation Patterns
The results described in the previous section offer descriptive tabulations of asset allocation
patterns by age, sex, and pay, but do not hold other factors constant that might alter measured
effects in multivariate models. In this section we turn to an analysis of what has been learned in a
multivariate context, and what remains to be learned.
One problem plaguing research in this area is that few analysts have had the requisite
microeconomic data needed to empirically hold constant a range of sociodemographic and firm-side
factors indicating how savers allocate assets in their retirement accounts. Understanding what
factors influence employees’ asset allocations in their portfolios in a multivariate context requires
good data on workers’ income level, age, sex, pay, education, and sex, as well as wealth and portfolio
allocations. In addition, it would be useful to gain a deeper understanding what potential “policy
tools” are that would influence asset allocation decisions in retirement accounts.
A recent effort in this direction was undertaken by Kennickell et al. (1996) using a
nationally representative dataset  on about 4,000 households examined in the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finance. Respondents to this extensive questionnaire were asked questions regarding
whether and from whom they sought financial advice, which could then be linked with information
on the households’ retirement assets and other wealth holdings. Specifically the SCF question
posed was “How do you (and your husband/wife) generally decide what kind of saving and
investments to make - do you get help from an accountant, a banker, a broker, a tax advisor, a
lawyer, a friend or relative, or what?” (Kennickell et al. 1996). The fmdings, summarized in Table
1I.C. 1, show that only 45% of the 4,000 nationally representative households questioned sought
financial advice. Of those, the vast majority - 57% - obtained information from relatives and
friends. Only a quarter of the people contacted a financial professional for fmancial  advice,
including bankers (26%), brokers and accountants (17 and 14%), and tax advisers and lawyers (9
and 11% respectively). Differences by income level are probably not surprising: people earning
$25,000 or less were far more likely to consult friends and relatives than average, while higher-paid
respondents were much more likely to go to brokers, bankers, and accountants. (Similar differences
were observed by wealth level).
Responses about peoples’ sources of advice were then linked with data on their financial
portfolios, while holding constant a range of other factors including age, education, earnings, sex,
ethnicity, retirement and marital status. The net effect of different types of advice on three
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outcome measures was then measured, focusing on how diversified the households’ assets were, the
household’s overall level of saving, and what fraction of household assets was devoted to stock. The
authors arrived at the following conclusions (Kennickell et al., 1996):
l Households indicating they obtained any financial advice were more likely to have more
types of financial assets. The positive effect of friends/relatives and brokers on diversification was
stronger than for other types of advice.
l Households that reported using financial advice, particularly those that relied on friends
and relatives, had saving rates that did not differ from non-users. Those consulting brokers had
higher than average saving rates; in some models, people who used bankers and lawyers had lower
than average saving rates.
l Households getting financial advice tended to hold 25% more assets in stocks and mutual
funds, and the positive effect was strongest for those working with brokers.17
Why people obtaining financial advice should save differently, and in particular why
brokers should have the strongest effect on saving rates and asset diversification, remains to be
determined. A possible explanation for the phenomenon might be that brokers are able to explain
risk and return patterns to financially naive investors in a way that influences their investment
patterns. In a recent case reported by Benartzi and Thaler (1996), newly-hired staff members at a
California university were presented with a questionnaire giving two different formats for data on
their 401(k) investment options. In both cases respondents were asked to select the fraction of
assets to invest in “Fund A” versus “Fund B” after being shown a chart with historical rates of
return under the two funds. Participants were not told in advance that Fund A returns were
actually derived from simulations of an index of value-weighted stock returns and Fund B returns
were derived from Ibbotson’s annual returns on 5-year bonds. The difference between the two cases
was how the researchers presented data on each fund’s returns. In the first scenario, one-year
returns were arrayed from best to worst, and in the second scenario, 30-year holding periods were
arrayed in the same fashion. In the first scenario, the median allocation to the stock fund was only
40% -- because respondents fastened on the fact that Fund A had experienced negative 40% returns
at least once. In the second scenario, the median stock allocation rose to 90%, because respondents
realized that over all 30-year holding periods there was a small chance of only a small negative
return. Hence the psychological research strongly suggests that different data presentations on
risk and return dramatically alters peoples’ portfolio allocation results, and it may be that brokers
have been the most adept at discerning this in the recent past.
To examine this point in more detail, Figure 1I.C. 1 presents a similar scenario to the
experiment from the Bernatzi and Thaler study. The two panels show the results of simulating
17 Point estimate supplied in personal communication.
Mitchell/Moore - Retirement Wealth34
draws from historical stock and bond data for the seventy year period 1926-1995.ls  For the l-year
return simulations, real returns on stocks range from a low of -37.4% to a high of 53.4%, with a
mean of 9.4% and a standard deviation of 20.4%. Real returns on bonds are lower on average at
2.7%, but are more tightly distributed - ranging from - 15.5% to 35.1% with a standard deviation of
10.6%. The returns exhibit no discernible pattern with some instances of both extremely good and
extremely bad stock returns.
The second panel shows the results of simulating returns over alternative 30-year holding
periods, from the annual data; we then annualize the longer returns. The results suggest that
stocks “dominate” bonds - the mean and a substantial portion of the mass of the simulated stock
return distribution is to the right (higher returns) than the simulated bond distribution. For the
stock distribution the mean annual real return is 7.3% with a standard deviation of 3.8%.19  The
lowest of the 10,000 simulated values is -6.6% and the highest is 21.9%. For bonds the
corresponding mean and standard deviation are 2.0% and 1.9%, respectively, and values range from
-4.3% to 9.5%. The return distributions have a familiar bell-shape resembling normal distributions.
People who argue stocks truly “dominate” bonds in the long run (e.g. Siegel 1995) base their
argument on an apparent inter-temporal diversification. While there is much to be said for this
case, a few caveats should be noted. The first of these centers on how the distributions of 30 year
returns are calculated. In our table, for instance, the 10,000 simulated 30-year histories are
effectively assuming that 300,000 years of return data are available for analysis. Of course this is
not actually the case; instead only a 70-year history is available on market data, containing but two
non-overlapping 30-year samples.
Another issue is that of rebalance risk and default or business-failure risk. All simulations
such as these use annual return data, which may be appropriate for a stock portfolio which is
rebalanced periodically. Even traditional benchmark indices such as the Standard &Poor’s 500
(SP500) or the Dow Jones Industrial Average @MIA) occasionally drop older stocks and replace
them with new ones. Rebalancing however is harder to justify for long government bonds. The
return on a bond is a combination of the coupon payments and fluctuations in the price of the bond.
If bonds are held to maturity (which is likely for households), the volatility in returns is
significantly reduced. If held to maturity, US Treasuries carry negligible default risk. The same
1s Data are from annual returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) SBBI fde.
Stocks are represented by the total (capital gains plus dividends) return on the S&P 500. Bonds are
represented by the United States Treasury Bond total return. Returns are deflated by the annual
change in the CPI.
19 It may seem odd that if the annual average real return for stocks from the SBBI data is 9.2%,
that the average annualized return from a 30 year return history is only 7.3%. This is a result of
Jensen’s inequality, which states that for a concave function the expected of the function of a
random variable is less than or equal to the function of the expectation of the random variable.
@wxl c mm ).
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cannot be said for individual stocks, or in some cases, entire stock markets. This is known as the
“survival problem”, examined by Brown, Goetzman, and Ross (1995) who show looking back at
return data on the winners imparts an upward bias to return statistics. Over long periods this may
be a very real problem for stock returns. The return history for the original portfolio of securities
held in the DJIA or the SP500 may tell quite a different story than the rebalanced indices.
In the next few years there will be much opportunity for useful work in this field, as new
data become available with which to explore the question of how assets are allocated and what
influences this decision. Clearly one critical issue is how to measure investors’ tastes for risk and
how these shape the portfolios they seek to hold. The Health and Retirement Study mentioned
above has included several experimental modules over the years designed to get at respondents’
underlying risk aversion parameters. Whether these prove to be useful predictors of asset
allocation outcomes is a subject for future study, along with an investigation of whether these are
stable over time.
A different set of issues has to do with how sensitive investors are to changes in the external
environment. Factors potentially driving household asset allocation patterns are many, including
current and anticipated future taxes (e.g. capital gains taxes, the tax treatment of pension
contributions and interest on home mortgages), prices and costs (e.g. interest rate effects on housing
prices, administrative charges associated with different asset portfolios), inflation (e.g. the potential
role of indexed bonds), and perceptions of stock market performance. It is fair to say, however, that
the study of how these multivariate factors affect saving levels and asset allocation within saving
portfolios is as yet in its infancy.20 The same conclusion applies to retirement assets as a subset of
households’ overall assets, as well.
D. Conclusions
While earlier sections asked what factors seem to influence retirement saving levels, this
section has sought to examine how people invest the assets they do have control over. One
important conclusion is that this is a relatively new field, about which a great deal more remains to
be learned. Researchers have been severely handicapped because they lacked good data on
household asset accumulation patterns and asset holdings as well as other pertinent information
about preferences and constraints. These limitations have begun to be relaxed recently with new
datasets, and researchers are now moving into the field with enthusiasm.
We also conclude that there are strong differences of opinion across the business and
research communities regarding what mix people should hold in terms of equities, bonds, and other
assets. If anything the so-called folk wisdom suggests that people should hold assets such as stock
in their youth inversely correlated with their human capital, and move to less volatile holdings later
20 For an excellent recent review of the determinants of saving see Browning and Lusardi (1996).
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in life. This pattern appears to hold in the real world, with younger participants in private sector
defined contribution or 401(k) pension plan having 50 to 60% of their funds in equities, and older
workers being typically less heavily invested in equities. Public sector employees are found to hold
fewer equities, as do women workers as a rule. Some of these patterns may be due to risk aversion
patterns that vary across workers; other patterns may be attributable to financial advice offered by
brokers. The fact that most Americans fail to obtain investment advice from informed sources
indicates a substantial need for additional financial literacy.
III. The Process of Retirement Asset Decumulation
In previous sections we addressed the question of how consumers build up savings that they
can then chose to consume in retirement. In this section, we turn to an examination of the asset
decumulation phase, and ask how people are handling this process.
A. Targets for Asset Decumulation
It is reasonable to ask at the outset what the goal of asset decumulation over the retirement
period should be. If lifespans and income as well as consumption streams were predictable, the
simple life cycle model would imply that a rational and far-seeing retiree should draw down wealth
steadily so as to maintain consumption, exhausting his asset stock just at death. At that date, the
only assets remaining would be those intended to be passed on as bequests. Therefore a testable
implication of this model is that older people would be expected to consume more than their income.
with declines in wealth funding the difference. One might also anticipate that dissaving would be
greatest among childless older people, and least among older persons planning on leaving an
inheritance to their children. These implications have been tested in a range of empirical studies,
as we shall show below.
Before turning to the evidence, it is important to recognize that economists realize that
older people do not live in the certainty world just described. Retirees face an unknown date of
death, uncertainty about human, financial, and physical capital, and substantial uncertainty about
future paths of government and family support opportunities. They also confront tremendous risk
in terms of future inflation and what this does to their retirement wealth.
Accordingly, theoretical research has worked to incorporate these key aspects of uncertainty
into a more richly formulated life cycle framework in recent years. Unfortunately, these modeling
efforts yield few clear-cut testable implications about anticipated wealth decumulation patterns in
old age (Browning and Lusardi 1996). For instance, if people face a substantial risk of needing
expensive nursing home care in old age, they may rationally save more to protect against this cost.
This would imply very little dissaving among the elderly, particularly for the younger half of the
cohort; conversely the older half of the cohort would be likely to have much larger nursing home
expenditures and dissave quickly.
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At the same time, of course, peoples’ saving decisions interact with government support
programs for the indigent. For example, eligibility criteria for Medicaid induce some to consume all
their assets in order to qualify for government-subsidized nursing home coverage. As a result this
policy probably encourages more rapid dissaving among the younger half of the older cohort than
would otherwise be the case. But the fact remains that adding important uncertainty to life cycle
saving models injects so much complexity that there are few testable predictions about expected
savingdissaving  in old age from these theoretical studies. About the most precise prediction that
can be offered is that virtually no model would predict older peoples’ assets to continue to grow
during retirement; whether they decline or remain roughly constant is not theoretically predicted.
B. The Facts About Retirement Asset Decumulation
Understanding what drives saving and d&saving has been a central goal of the economics
literature at least since Lord Keynes, yet investigation has been slowed by a formidable obstacle -
lack of good data. Most countries including the US produce annual macroeconomic statistics on
total household and national saving, but these data are controversial due to questions about
accuracy and probable underreporting. Aggregate saving data are also not terribly helpful in terms
of understanding which kinds of people save, how much they save, and what influences these
saving patterns.
For these reasons, household level data are preferred for behavioral analysis, where
individual families are canvassed on their income and expenditures, assets and debts, and other
information on their consumption needs and expectations about the future. This latter type of
survey has begun to be developed and fielded in the United States only recently with the Health
and Retirement Study. Because the HRS is intended to be longitudinal - people are reinterviewed
every two years for the foreseeable future - the survey can hope to accurately estimate changes in
asset levels (saving or d&saving) as respondents age. This is a costly survey to undertake,
requiring long-term follow-up before good data on life cycle saving patterns can be teased out of the
information; early results are available only from the frost two waves (1992 and 1994). The AHEAD
study (Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old) focuses on people age 70 and older, affording
a unique opportunity to evaluate changes in assets of those in the second half of the retirement
period. Other studies such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) do not follow the same
households though time longitudinally, though they do offer useful information on assets and
liabilities as well. Because of the fact that the needed data to do the analysis is only now becoming
available, it is not surprising that there remains so much to be learned about wealth accumulation
and decumulation in old age,
In exploring the evidence on wealth decumulation patterns in old age, two questions are of
primary interest. First, we ask how older people draw down their “bequeathable wealth” as they
age. By bequeathable wealth we mean to include all non-annuitized wealth that could in principle
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be passed on to someone else (Kotlikoff  and Spivak 1981). This approach therefore focuses on
relatively liquid assets such as checking/saving accounts, mutual funds, stocks, bonds, housing,
IRA’s and lumpsum rollovers from previous pensions, etc. It takes as given the household’s split
between annuities (social security and other annuities not included in bequeathable wealth) and all
other sources of wealth. The second question then asks how older people divide their assets
between bequeathable and non-bequeathable wealth. We take up each in turn.
1. Financial Wealth Decumulation Patterns
Turning to the fast issue, the question is how do older people spend their financial wealth
stock as they move through the retirement period. One crude way analysts have attacked this
question is to correlate dependency rates and private saving using cross-country analysis. The
evidence suggests a negative effect - that is, having a larger fraction of elderly reduces private
saving rates -but controversy remains over how big this relationship is, ranging from nil to quite
large in the set of studies recently summarized by Disney (1996).21
More persuasive to some is evidence from microeconomic data that also finds people
dissaving as they age. The studies reviewed in Table 1II.B. 1 imply that wealth falls with age for
the elderly, particularly so among single people without dependents (who are least likely to be
interested in leaving bequests). The range of average annual financial wealth spenddown is 2.4%
per year, higher for the childless and lower for those with dependents. Whether this wealth
drawdown follows a smooth or a bumpy trajectory is as yet to be determined, though recent UK
data suggest that older peoples’ financial wealth declines quickly right after retirement, remains
constant until a dozen or so years into the retirement period, and after that point dissaving sets in
again (Disney 1996).
Assessing whether this rate of spenddown is “too large or too small” depends on a wide
range of economic factors including among other things, how long the retiree anticipates living,
what discount rate he or she uses, and what assumptions are made about financial market returns
on one’s bequeathable wealth holdings during the retirement period. (Taxes should also be taken
into account, of course). It also depends on how much annuity or income support benefits the
retiree anticipates receiving. In other words, one might be interested in computing the size of the
“programmed withdrawal” from financial wealth that would smooth a retiree’s income flow in old
age, so as to determine what standard of living that retiree asset accumulation would generate.
To illustrate the concept we have undertaken a schematic calculation of this nature in Table
III.B.2 for the median HRS respondent household. The goal of the computation is to determine the
21 Even less clear is what the effect of an aging population is on national saving as a whole, since
this effect depends on government expenditures on the aged - particularly social security - and
these programs are generally unfunded pay-as-you-go systems that are perceived as reducing
national saving (Disney 1996).
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annual income flows that could be generated using a programmed withdrawal methodology similar
to that propounded by the IRS in drawing down Individual Retirement Accounts. It should be noted
that the programmed withdrawal approach does not avoid the possibility that the retiree outlives
his assets; it is not a life annuity. Table III.B.2 summarizes the findings by showing that the
median HRS household following a programmed withdrawal approach from net financial assets
would have a very modest income stream in retirement, abstracting from pensions and social
security benefits payable in retirement. Specifically, annuitizing the median fmancial  wealth of
approximately $100,000 over a two-person household (the norm in the HRS) for the retirement
period generates a real annual flow of $5500.22 Compared to pre-retirement average income, these
annual flow values are sufficient to provide only a very small replacement rate - exclusive of other
benefit programs.
One reason that this pattern of spenddown may be deemed low is that people have
alternative assets that could be used in the event of need, including sale of their house (to be
discussed next) and annuity income flow (to be discussed below). Another reason is that at least
some portion of the population may want to leave a bequest, most likely those with children. In
Table III.B.3 we tabulate responses to questions from the HRS in which respondents indicate their
intention to pass on bequests to their children. It is interesting to note that wealth appears
uncorrelated with intention to leave an inheritance. However, the expectation of leaving an
inheritance is increasing in wealth. We interpret this to mean that older people who expect to leave
a bequest do so only if they have accumulated substantial wealth by a particular point in their lives,
but they do not seem to save in order to leave a bequest.
2. Housing Value Changes in Retirement
Because housing constitutes such a large portion of elderly American’s net worth, it is
important to ask whether people decumulate housing assets in old age to help finance consumption.
The answer seems to be that in the US at least, past retirees have not released home equity by
moving to smaller, less expensive homes, nor have they availed themselves of reverse annuity
mortgages, a financial product designed to unlock home equity for older homeowners wishing to
access their cash without moving out of their homes. As a result, some experts have argued that
older people hold “excess” housing, and advocate developing mechanisms to help release this excess
(see Disney 1996). On the other hand there are technical problems with doing so, including the
possibility of adverse selection (mainly the long-lived will seek to purchase the reverse annuity) and
the fact that home depreciation and loss of value is a problem faced by older people’s housing stock
(for a list of references see TIRS 1995). In any event, the size of the annuity that would thus be
generated tends to be quite small at least until the age of 75 (Skinner 1993).
22 This abstracts from insurance loads charged by annuity vendors; see Mitchell, Poterba and Warshawsky  (1997).
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3. Evidence on Annuitization in Retirement
The discussion thus far has focused on the question of older persons’ drawdowns of financial
assets described above as bequeathable (i.e. not annuitized). Next we turn to the question of how
much of household wealth is, in fact, available to be drawn down, and how much is only available as
an annuity payout. As was previewed above, many retirees have little if any financial wealth at all,
reaching retirement with only a Social Security entitlement. Under current law, this entitlement
cannot be borrowed against, nor taken as a lump sum. (It should be noted that some recent Social
Security reform proposals would allow retirees access at least part of their social security accounts;
see TIRS 1995).
What about other sources of income flows? Among HRS respondents about half were
entitled to an employer-provided pension benefit (See Table I.A. 1.). In keeping with the overall
changes underway in the US pension environment, retirees in years gone by tended to be covered
mainly by defined benefit (DB) plans, but increasingly workers and then retirees are owed a defined
contribution (DC) entitlement. Not only have plan types changed, but features of existing plans
have also adapted to competitive pressures. Thus until recently DB pensions required retirees to
take an annuity payout, but in the last decade employer surveys show that they are allowing
eligible retirees to receive increasing portions of their benefits in lump-sums at retirement (McGill
et al. 1996) Of course in DC plans, lump sum cashouts have always been the norm, according to the
same plan-level surveys.
One question that has not been well-researched yet is how pension-covered workers are
responding to the new availability of pension lump sums. Policymakers’ concern has been that
people might pervert the intent of the pension system by “blowing the money” on unneeded
consumption. To discourage this type of behavior the federal government has levied an excise tax
on pension funds distributed before the recipient is age 55; someone withdrawing his fund early
pays this penalty plus income tax on the amount. Empirical analysis of the effect of this excise tax
has found that most recipients at low income levels are not deterred much from cashing out their
lump sums, though for higher income workers a one percent increase in the excise penalty led to
almost half a percent fewer rollovers (Chang 1995). It also appears that the higher the value of the
pension lump sum amount, the more likely a participant is to roll it over into a tax qualified account
rather than spend it (McGill et al. 1996).
Another issue is how the lump sums available from pension plans are invested during the
retirement phase. Virtually nothing is known about this question at present, and it would be most
useful to devise a nationally representative dataset capable of addressing the issue in the immediate
future. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most workers given the option to take cash from their
pension accounts are taking the cash rather than purchasing life annuities through group
retirement plans. This is surprising in that a life annuity provided through one’s employer would
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tend to be priced at group rates below those offered to individually-purchased annuity buyers (for
adverse selection reasons as well as because of scale economies). The size of the group discount
would of course vary with group characteristics; on the other hand, inasmuch as individually-
priced annuities devoted 10.15% of assets to administration and overhead costs (Mitchell et al.
1997), this is more than double the group annuity cost figure offered by industry experts. The cost
advantage of buying an annuity product through a group should be examined more fully by those
seeking sensible ways to decumulate retirement assets.
When thinking about annuity issues there is another issue that needs to be more fully
recognized, which is that people seem to be increasingly likely to buy guaranteed period certain
options rather than simple life annuities. This is evident in a recent survey higher education
faculty and researchers covered by the TIAA-CREF pension system (Hammond forthcoming). What
was striking about this study was that, over time, participants have grown increasingly likely to
select lo-year and 20.year  certain options rather than single life annuities as was the norm in the
past. In addition, people tend to hold their defined contribution accruals as a variable annuity into
retirement rather than taking a fixed benefit, notwithstanding the additional capital market risk
imposed on the retiree by this strategy.
Putting these trends together, it appears increasingly likely for pensioners to lay claim on
part or all of their pension assets without annuitizing them, in contrast to years past. If this trend
continues it suggests that ever larger segments of retiree wealth will move into the nonannuitized,
and potentially bequeathable category; this will place increasing responsibility on retirees to
manage the decumulation phase more carefully than ever before.
C. Factors Influencing Retirement Asset Decumulation Patterns
Several factors are likely to influence asset decumulation patterns in retirement. Among
the most prominent would presumably be people’s expectations about the future - their own
anticipated longevity, the probability of poor health and the need for nursing home care, and future
macroeconomic variables including inflation and interest rates. In addition people’s risk aversion
and discount rates would be expected to influence how the form in which they hold retirement
assets, and how quickly they would draw down their assets in old age.
Relatively few surveys to date have elicited data on expectations of this sort. One
innovative exception in this regard is the HRS, which asked respondents about anticipated life
expectancy, inflation rates, and (for a subset of people) risk aversion and discount rates. These data
have just begun to be examined to see whether these expectations are correlated with respondents’
asset draw-down patterns; more additional research remains to be done. An interesting finding
thus far is that respondents seem to have a quite accurate estimate of their own life expectancy
based on a comparison of self-reported longevity probabilities with actuarial life tables (Hurd and
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McGarry 1995). Specifically, both men and women between age 51 and 61 seem to assess the
chances of survival to age 75 and 85 relatively accurately.
Also of interest is the finding that those expecting to live longer than average have
accumulated more than average assets, indicating a link between anticipated retirement periods
and saving. Future research will be able to determine whether those expecting to live longer than
average also handle their asset decumulation differently - for example, by drawing down their
wealth more slowly, by buying annuities, and by having pensions of the DB rather than the DC
variety. Research on people’s anticipated health problems, forecasts of macroeconomic variables,
risk aversion, and discount rates has not yet gotten very far, but it is anticipated that similar
research questions would be highly useful.
A related issue has to do with what people expect regarding their future retirement program
payouts and how these expectations influence their net financial wealth holdings. One of the
unusual and interesting aspects of the HRS study is that respondents were asked what they
anticipated receiving from their employer pension (if they had one), and from Social Security.
These benefit expectations can then be compared with benefit amounts computed using
administrative records from employers and the Social Security Administration, so as to judge how
accurate retirees’ estimates are.23 Yet to be tested is the hypothesis, for instance, that respondents
who prove to be overly optimistic about their pension and social security benefits are those who
undersaved when young, and overconsume their retirement assets when old. One might also expect
the overconfident to be more liquid and less annuitized in their retirement portfolios than other
retirees.
Clearly there are several other factors influencing asset decumulation patterns, including
the relative price of holding different assets and unwinding them. One important issue is the cost of
annuities available for purchase in the marketplace. Notwithstanding the claim made by previous
studies that the annuity market is quite imperfect, recent research (Mitchell et al. 1997) concludes
that individual annuity values are actually quite favorable compared to their price. In other words,
adverse selection and insurance loads have declined over time, making this insurance product much
more favorable to retirees now than in the past.
Taxes and government benefit programs also play a powerful role in asset decumulation
patterns in old age, yet thus far relatively little is known about how sensitive people are to these
programs. It is known, for instance, that people greatly understate the probability of needing and
the cost of nursing home care, perhaps because they mistakenly believe that Medicare will pay for
it. Instead, nursing home care in the US is available only through Medicaid, which is a means-
tested program requiring older people to exhaust their assets before becoming eligible for
23 Access to the administrative records is available only under special restrictive circumstances; see
the HRSAHEAD  internet site for further information (www.umich.edu/-hrswww/).
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government-paid nursing home care. Irrespective of which program older people have in mind, it is
alleged that many near the Medicaid asset threshold spend down their assets more rapidly than
they would otherwise so as to receive the coverage (Davis 1996). How potent this effect proves to be
empirically awaits further testing with newly available datasets. To the extent that eligibility for
other benefits is also conditioned on assets and/or income (e.g. housing subsidies, food stamps,
disability benefits), these other programs could have similar effects on asset decumulation behavior.
A great deal remains to be learned about these potentially complex interactions between
government programs and private behavior.
D. Conclusion
Cross-national studies generally show a small negative association between private saving
and the fraction of the population that is elderly. Microeconomic studies of older Americans using
longitudinal data suggest that older people dissave but only very gradually, at least until age 75 or
so.
A more detailed examination of these patterns will soon be possible with the two new
datasets under development. Researchers are on the verge of major new breakthroughs in
understanding patterns of asset decumulation in retirement. In particular, the HRS and associated
administrative databases will now enable analysts to explore retirement decumulation patterns in a
way not previously possible, linking financial, housing, pension and social security wealth to a
range of questions about expectations and attitudes toward risk. The AHEAD database, since it
focuses on somewhat older people, will also offer a vitally useful longitudinal picture of how older
peoples’ health problems influence their retirement assets, and will help identify where older people
appear to be underinsured in old age.
While there is much to learn about what influences asset decumulation in old age, there are
also lessons to be gleaned from past studies. We have argued here that retirees are able to lay claim
on increasingly large fractions of their retirement assets without annuitizing them, in contrast to
years past. This is placing growing responsibility on retirees to manage the decumulation process
carefully, more than perhaps ever before.
Looking ahead, it appears that many of the factors that induced older people to keep their
wealth in bequeathable form will be changing in the future, probably in the direction of enhancing
the private demand for annuities. The best available evidence suggests that the transition from DB
to DC pension plans will continue, meaning that ever fewer people will be guaranteed a pension
annuity stream for life. As this happens, more people will seek out a means to protect against
outliving their retirement assets. Another pending reform is the possibility of social security benefit
cuts which if it occurs will also increase the demand for privately purchased annuities as the
government’s role declines. If the private insurance market continues to offer competitive returns
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on the annuity premium dollar, this too is likely to enhance the product’s attractiveness. (Increases
in anticipated life expectancies would both increase demand and raise the product’s cost.)
Some factors could, of course, work in the opposite direction. For instance, of Medicaid and
Medicare benefits were substantially cut back, people would be exposed to more substantial medical
care bills. This might lead them to avoid annuitizing in order to have assets sufficient to cover a
period of time in a nursing home should the need arise. This would also produce some substitution
between long term care insurance and annuity insurance, unless insurers could design a new
contingent product that covered both nursing home risks and longer than expected longevity
(Disney 1996). And as we have mentioned, if public annuity benefits were to decrease in
importance, older parents may become more aware of the need to save more and hold these savings
as bequests, as an “inducement” to get children to deliver health and other care in old age.
IV. Lessons and Implications
The goal of this study was to review what is known about retirement asset accumulation
and decumulation to assess whether Americans are doing a reasonable job of preparing for
retirement, and spending down while in the retirement phase.
Part I of the analysis examined wealth accumulation patterns. Relatively little is known
about this area because of the extreme difficulty obtaining high quality data on household assets
and liabilities, but new surveys including the Health and Retirement Study have made it possible to
add to knowledge rapidly in this field. In our analysis we defined several different wealth measures
and compared accumulated values with a range of benchmarks often used in assessing retiree
wealth adequacy. On the basis of the best available data, we conclude that the median American on
the verge of retirement has accumulated too little wealth to support a comfortable retirement. To
achieve widely agreed-on retirement accumulation targets, a typical household with a head in his or
her mid-50’s would have to set aside 23% of income between now and age 65 to achieve a
replacement rate consistent with what retirement planners have recommended.
Part II of our investigation examined how people invest their assets intended for retirement.
Rules of thumb advocated by financial advisors typically recommend that the moderately risk-
averse investor hold 40.50% of his wealth in stocks and the rest in bonds. More complex models
recommend altering the mix of stock and bonds over the work life, depending on the investor’s
human capital characteristics. When we examined actual household allocations of financial asset
holdings, however, we found that most Americans hold relatively few financial assets (excluding
their homes). The median older household age 51-61 has only about $40,000 in net fmancial  assets
excluding company pension plan accruals, certainly not enough to hope to live well for 15-20 years
or longer in retirement. For this reason we focused in more detail on assets accumulated in
company sponsored pension plans, where we saw that the typical defined contribution participant
Mitchell/Moore - Retirement Wealth45
appears to have selected a portfolio quite in line with the financial advisors’ suggestions. It appears
that among younger workers in particular, it is now common to see participants hold 50.60% of
their assets in equities; even among low-wage workers, about a third of the pension portfolio goes to
stock purchase. The one area of some concern is that women employees are much less likely than
men to invest in stock in some pension systems, a finding that may produce lower-than-desired
benefit amounts in retirement.
Further delving into what is driving these investment patterns revealed some interesting
patterns. Specifically, households derive relatively little financial advice from financial experts,
relying instead on friends and relatives. However those who did report using brokers for financial
advice reported higher saving rates, and had more assets in stocks and mutual funds. This may be
because brokers are better able to explain risk and return to relatively financially uneducated
people, and in particular combat loss aversion described by the psychological literature.
We believe that at retirement people face another daunting prospect, which is the process of
decumulating assets in a logical and prudent manner so as to ensure a steady stream of
consumption in old age. Whether people do this sensibly has received very little attention as yet.
One reason is that past researchers lacked data covering this crucially important financial phase of
life. However recent longitudinal data collected in the HRS and the AHEAD surveys have begun to
rectify these limitations. Based on the evidence to date, we concluded that people have been able to
move into retirement with ever smaller components of their wealth in bequeathable, non-
annuitized, form. This is challenging retirees to manage their wealth ever more carefully, as
compared to a world in which most benefits are government pensions mandatorily annuitized. We
argued that there will probably be an enhanced demand for private annuities in the future as a
result of the move away from annuitization by company pensions and, perhaps, by government
pensions as well.
Looking Ahead
There are four developments that we believe will have a powerful effect on retirement
accumulation and decumulation patterns in the future. First, it seems clear that the switch from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans will continue. Sponsoring employers believe that the
DC option affords them a predictable benefit offering that meets workers’ needs, without the
additional complexity and risk-bearing associated with DB pensions. Employees too have become
accustomed to the greater portability associated with DC pensions along with the ability to invest
accruing assets as they see fit. As this movement carries over to the public sector, workers
everywhere will have to become more alert to the need to save more, to meet retirement
accumulation targets.
A second factor likely to have an influence on retirement saving and dissaving patterns is
government policy regarding tax qualified contributions to and withdrawal patterns from
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retirement accounts. Research reviewed above suggests that government tax qualification limits on
pension savings as well as maximum tax deferred payouts have important effects on the amounts
people put into and take out of their pensions. Any changes in government policy regarding the tax
status of pension contributions or benefits could powerfully affect future retirement saving patterns.
A third factor likely to influence saving and asset allocation patterns is the recent
introduction of inflation-indexed bonds or Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS). While
new to the United States, they have proven rather successful in Britain amounting to some 20% of
outstanding debt since their introduction more than a decade ago. Instruments of these sort have
long been advocated by economists who see them both as an instrument that allows investors to
hedge inflation risk and as a tool to accurately gauge market expectations of future inflation. While
there are still some questions regarding the true inflation hedging ability of these instruments
given current tax treatment, in certain circumstances they may prove quite beneficial.24 The most
obvious of these is inclusion in tax-favored savings vehicles such as IRA’s and 4Ol(k)‘s where the
inflation protection would be maintained.
Once the market for this debt is deeper and a wider variety of maturities are available, we
may see a veritable menu of inflation-indexed products. The introduction of TIPS should lay a
foundation for other public and private entities to follow suit and issue inflation indexed debt. More
importantly for our purposes, TIPS should allow for the introduction and development of a variety
of products to ensure consumption in retirement. These will include strips of TIPS into interest and
principal components, nominal for indexed swaps, inflation options, inflation insurance, and
possibly most importantly for retiree households, indexed annuity products.
Although inflation is currently rather low by historical terms, an inflation rate of 3.5% cuts
purchasing power in half in 20 years. The longer the period over which an income stream is paid
out, the more important inflation protection becomes. If retirement ages do not increase as life
expectancy increases, demand for indexed annuities should continue to grow as the baby boom
approaches and moves into retirement.
Finally, it is crucial to remind ourselves of the central role played by social security in
retirees’ incomes today, and how the promise of this benefit profoundly influences today’s workers
as they plan for their own retirement. What is difficult to foretell is how taxes and benefits will be
adapted to bring what is currently an insolvent system into balance again. If taxes are raised in
accord with the proposal to maintain benefits, private saving will not increase and may even decline
- which could exacerbate the saving shortfall identified above. By contrast if the system were
downsized so that only a minimum guarantee were provided by the government plan and all extra
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taxes saved in individual accounts, this might raise private saving - though the overall effect would
depend on whether the individual accounts would be fully offset by reductions in other saving. In
any event, a massive change in the nation’s major source of retirement income would be expected to
have substantial spillover effects on private asset accumulation and decumulation patterns.
A Shift in Focus
It is inevitable that, in the future, American households will bear more of the burden for
their consumption in retirement. As defined contribution pensions continue to replace defined
benefit pension plans, and when social security is reformed, this will bring about fundamental shifts
in peoples’ retirement holdings. Already we have seen this, beginning among the assets held by
those with 401(k) accounts. Stocks are accounting for a greater and greater percentage of the assets
held. This may be a combination of a number of factors including a prolonged bull market and
increasing sophistication and education of plan participants.
Clearly more work needs to be done on these fronts. Households need to be educated on the
need for saving and the availability of vehicles for doing so. Why households do not make better
and more frequent use of tax-favored vehicles such as IRA’s remains a puzzle. If households are not
accumulating enough assets for retirement under our benchmarks, it might be because households
are aware of this and simply plan to significantly reduce consumption in retirement. Alternatively,
if people are not aware of their sizable wealth shortfall, they will find eventually that they are
forced to consume much less than anticipated, and/or turn to government programs for support in
old age. Should social security benefits be cut, reductions in old age consumption will be even
greater.
In the last half century the United States saw a substantial risk transfer from the
individual to the group, with the development of massive government institutions such as social
security and Medicare, along with employer sponsored defined benefit pension plans to protect
consumption in old age. This pattern has now reversed and will continue down this track in the
future, with new pension and saving vehicles transferring risk back to individuals and households.
While the increased personal responsibility imposed by these changes has many positive aspects, it
does raise problems regarding the almost complete elimination of some traditional risk pooling
mechanisms. For instance, retirees are much more exposed to longevity risk without annuities, and
to some degree they are more exposed to investment risk when they hold lump sums with no
predetermined draw-down path,
T* It may be argued that the British stimulated demand for inflation indexed debt by changing
their tax laws so that capital gains are calculated in real terms. Moore (1995) discusses this and
other issues relating to the introduction and demand for inflation-indexed debt.
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Evidently the change in the market for retirement accumulation and decumulation has
produced substantial d&intermediation, where people bear more risk directly instead of relying on
traditional wealth-building and wealth-preserving institutions and mechanisms. In order for these
changes to proceed smoothly, individuals must become more educated, and probably hold more
reserves, to substitute for these displaced institutions and mechanisms. It seems likely that these
changes provide an opportunity for new devices for saving, as well as methods to strengthen
existing ones. One approach we have explored here involves educating workers as to their projected
future needs will be, and instructing them about how to save to meet these needs. This will
probably require expansion of existing programs such as IRA’s and 401(k)‘s by increasing
contribution limits, expanding tax-qualified status, and perhaps allowing greater flexibility in
borrowing from these programs to increase their apparent liquidity while maintaining an emphasis
on retirement saving.
In addition, insurance and financial markets will be called on to take an expanded role in
risk pooling. If households increasingly manage their own retirement assets instead of having
corporate pension managers handle the funds in defined benefit pension plans, there will be a
greater need for individual annuity products to hedge mortality risk. As life expectancy increases
and social security provides less of a hedge against inflation risk, indexed annuities should
command a greater piece of the individual annuity market.
This is a time of substantial change and opportunity in retirement planning research, as
well as for financial products aimed at helping people increase their retirement security. An
exciting range of new questions can now be examined with emerging datasets, testing aspects of the
theoretical framework explaining retirement accumulation and decumulation. This blending of
theory and empirical research promises useful answers to practical questions about why people
save, what instruments they save with, and how they consume their savings in retirement -
questions of central importance to the future of retirement in America.
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Table I.A.l: Wealth Components by Source in the HRS Around the Time of Retirement ($1992)





(2) Net Home Value
(3) Retirement Wealth 257,274 52
Social Security Wealth 133,662 27
Pension Wealth 116,012 23






























Number of Observations 7,607
Source: Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, Steinmeier (1997) Tables 3 and 4 and authors’ tabulations of 1992 HRS
Note: Average for the median 10% is the average value for those households between the 45th and 55th percentiles.
Among Households Holding
Wealth Sources




















Average Value of Wealth in Percentile Category
Total Pension Social Security Net Home Net Financial
Wealth Wealth Wealth Value Wealth
$ 9,248 $ 1,205 $ 16,567 $ (739) $ (8,051)
61,322 1,171 52,380 5,602 1,887
122,965 8,100 89,090 14,756 9,271
252,119 36,987 127,967 42,540 40,127
457,376 109,967 157,649 86,119 93,116
762,738 239,727 178,888 128,108 201,247
1,162,428 363,966 187,709 175,418 419,145
2,543,780 475,267 184,399 324,041 1,549,486
Overall
45-55
499,187 116,012 133,622 78,826 163,127
339,725 60,102 144,801 67,716 59,298
Ratio of90-95
to 5-10 18.96 310.82 3.58 31.31 222.12
.
Source: Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, Steinmeier (1997) Tables 13, 14, and 15 plus additional
tabulations by Tom Steinmeier and the authors.








Figure I.A.l: Distribution of Wealth Components in the HRS Around the Time of Retirement
O-5 5. IO 10 - 25 25 - 50 50 - 75 76 - 90 90 - 95 95 - 100
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Source: Gustman,  Mitchell, Samwick,  Steinmeier (1997)Table IA3: Net Financial Wealth in the HRS Around the Time of Retirement
By Household Characteristics ($1992)
Net Financial Wealth Net Financial + Housing Wealth
Mean Median Mean Median
Education


















Whole Sample 175,974 41,150
Number of Households 7,607
$ 132,180 $ 18,000 $ 182,028 $ 6 1,050
141,831 40,000 201,850 101,200
291,441 101,000 388,340 213,228
373,752 139,000 496,850 231,000
220,539 64,000 299,693 139,100
144,980 2 1,000 183,115 45,000
60,953 8,000 102,349 36,904
201,780 56,000 274,960 126,700
53,300 5,000 82,584 28,500
66,525 5,000 104,844 31,500
55,982 3,000 84,873 18,000
88,585 17,650 135,658 58,850
115,569 41,000 179,852 102,250
173,095 68,220 247,686 140,000
446,778 165,200 561,669 276,000
241,913 102,000
Source: Authors’ tabulation of 1992 HRS data.Table I.A.4: Trends in Net Financial Weath Including Housing - Baby Boomers versus Their Parents ($1992)





O-20% . $ 200 $ 300 0.67
zo-40% 3,300 2,700 1.22
40-60% 12,000 8,000 1.50
60-80% 18,200 19,100 0.95
80-100% 80,800 28,000 2.89
Sample Medians 9,900 6,700 1.48 59,500 32,200 1.85
Note: *First Wave baby boomers are defined as the cohort born 1946 - 55
(age 35 - 44 in 1989); Second Wave baby boomers are the cohort born 1956 - 64
(age 25 - 34 in 1989). Parents’ cohorts are those of the same age groupings in 1962.
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Source: Palmer, as cited in McGill et al. (1996)Figure I.B.3: Schematic Diagram of Dynamic Programming Approach to Life Cycle with Uncertainty
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. . Net Flnanclal Wea1tlJ
Current (Age 56)
Projected Growth
40%  40% Stocks
60% Govt. Bonds




Value to age 65














Projected at age 65
.
Social Secu tv Wealth
Current (Ag”e 56)
Projected Increase
Proj. at age 65
Projected Total Value of












-Amt Needed to Sustain
-Shortfall
-Annual Saving to meet goal
- as a percentage of income
50% J&S
-Amt Needed to Sustain
-Shortfall
-Annual Saving to meet goal
- as a percentage of income
70% Replacement Ratio









-Amt Needed to Sustain
-Shortfall
-Annual Saving to meet goal
- as a percentage of income





-Amt Needed to Sustain $ 524,800 $ 450,500 $ 392,300
-Shortfall . 79,500 5,200 0
-Annual Saving to meet goal 7,100 500 0
- as a percentage of income 15.4% 1.1% 0.0%
Source: Authors’ calculationsTable I.B.3: Current and Projected Retiree Well-Being in the EKRS by Race,
Marital Status, & Sex
I. Well Being by Race and Sex





Projected median income-to-needs ratio including
housing wealth
Projected median income-to-needs ratio excluding
housing wealth
Projected % in poverty
Projected % in poverty, excluding housing wealth
II. Well Being by Marital Status and Sex





Projected median income-to-needs ratio including
housing wealth
Projected median income-to-needs ratio excluding
housing wealth
Projected % in poverty
Projected % in poverty, exciuding housing wealth






4.6 4.0 2.7 2.1
4.3 6.9 16.9 22.7
3.5 3.3 1.8 1.4
2.6 2.4 1.6 1.3
4.0 8.3 22.9 35.4
5.8 10.2 25.3 38.2
Married Nonmarried
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MJ3N WOMEN MEN WOMEN
4.4
4.1
3.1 3.3 1.8 1.1











Health and Retirement Survey, 1992; estimates are weighted to provide nationally representative
statistics.Table I.C.l.: The Effects of Frequent Retirement Seminars in the Workplace
Incremental impact of All Non-Highly Highly
tiequent seminars on: Employees Compensated Compensated
Participation Rates (%) 7.7 * 12.1 * 6.6
Contribution Rates (%) 0.4 1.1 ** -0.1
Source: Bernheim (forthcoming)
Notes:* denotes statistical significance at the 90% level.
** denotes significance at the 95% level.Figure I.C.2.: Estimated Employee Contribution Rates to 401(k) Plans
under Alternative Communications and Matching Programs
1 1
0 0 I I    I I    I I    I I    I I    I* I*   11 11   " "   " "   '1 '1   '1' '1'   I' I'
10 10 30 30 50 50 70 70 90 90 110 110 130 130 150 150
Thousands of dollars
Source: Clark and Scheiber (forthcoming)Table II&: Financial Advisors’ Recommended Investment Portfolio Mix
Source Fraction of Portfolio Bonds/Stocks




Jane Bryant Quinn 20













40 40 20 1.00
55 40 5 0.73
50 40 10 0.80
60 30 10 . 0.50

















Source: Derived from Canner, Mankiw, and Weil(1994):Tl.Table II.B.l: Median Non-Housing Net Financial Assets in the HRS
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Source: Authors’computations, 1992 HRSTable II.B.2 Pension Plan Investment Portfolios by Plan Type
Pension Fund Assets by Asset Qpe
as a Fraction of Net Assets
I. Private Defined Benefit
Trusteed Single Employer
II
Green\vich  DB Universe































Large (>lOOEes) 1993 46% 38% na 6% 10% personal communication, PWBA,  3/97

































personal communication, PWBA, CU97
III. Private Multiemployer
Trusteed
IV. Public Defined Benefit
Greenwich DB Universe





















(*) Includes GIG’s and Insured hmds.
(+) Totals may not sum to 100% due  due to rounding.
Year ZFnuitv Bonds/FI’*’  Real Estate SourceTable II.B.3. 401(k) Assets In Specified Investment Holdings by Participant
Age and Income
Plan Participant Age
Investment Catepory 21 - 30 31- 40 41- 50 51- 60 >60 Total
Stock Fund 39% 36% 30% 22% 10% 25%
Company Stock 11 9 6 6 3 6
International Stock 3 3 4 3 1 3
Balanced 6 8 11 8 1 8
Fixed Income 41 43 49 62 85 58
Plan Participant Earnings (SK)
Investment Category ~15 15-25 25-35 35-45 45-60 60-75 75-100 Total
Stock Fund 25% 22% 20% 19% * 25% 42% 45% 52%
Company Stock 7 8 8 7 7 11 8 2
International Stock 1 1 2 2 2 4 6 10
Balanced 62 63 62 67 53 32 26 27
Fixed Income 6 7 9 7 12 11 15 8




Past Accumulation New Contribution
Men Women Men Women
Diversified Equity Index 14% 13% 42% 44%
Employer Stock 41 42 19 17
Fixed Income 45 45 39 40
Source: Bajtelsmit and Vanderhei (forthcoming) Table 3.Table II.B.5.: Asset Allocation Patterns by Sex:
Federal Thrift Savings Plan Results, 1994
Descrhtion Women
Percent of Employees
Government Securities Fund [Gl*
StockFund [Cl alone
Bond Fund PI alone












Source: Adapted from Hinz and Turner (forthcoming). *All participants were required to contribute
to the G (government bond) fund.Table II.B.6: Expected Difference in Retiree Pension Assets by Sex Resulting from
Different Allocation of Pension Contributions to Stock over the Worklife
Years in the Plan Male/Female Portfolio Size
10 1.04
30 1.13









Type of Advice Used Among Those Using
Friend/
Relative Banker Broker Acc’t Tax Adv. Lawver
57% 26 17 14 9 11
64 29 6 6 1 14
61 27 12 9 5 10
54 25 19 17 14 8
39 20 42 34 9 11
Sotirce: Kennickell et al. (1996)Figure II.C.l. - One Year and 30 Year Return SimulationsTable III. B.l Changes in Bequeathable Wealth Among Older US Households
Study Annual Rate of
Wealth Change
Summarized in Hurd (1993: T6)
Mirer (1980) -1.2%







1963 & 1964 Federal ReseI-ve  data
NLS Mature Men
Single People, RHS 1969-79
Couples, RHS 1969-79
Single People, SIPP 1984
Couples, SIPP 1984
Sources: Adapted from Hurd (1993: T. 6), Disney (1996) ,Table III.B.2.: Annual Income From Assets for Typical HRS Household at Age 65 ($1992)
Assets Drawn Down Assets Drawn Down
Using IRS Minimum In Accordance With
Distribution Tables 100% J&S Annuity
As Guidelines As A Guideline
Assuming No Additional Saving
All Assets other than
Social Security* $ 10,800







Assuming 23.3% Annual Saving












Est. Am. Household SS Benefits
Source: Authors’ Calculations .
15,000
Notes: * Assumes household has access and control of distribution of Pension Wealth.
100% J&S Annuity factor calculated using Social Security mortality tables for males
and females born in 1936 and a real interest rate of 2.5%.Table III.B.3.: Financial Asset Holdings in the HRS by Bequest Intention




Spouses Differ in Opinion
Financial Net Worth
Median Mszan





Em e& Median M!csn
Definetly Wii $ 140,000 $ 459,718
Probably Will 102,000 258,039
Possibly Will 66,000 207,402
Probably Will Not 32,700 95,572
Definetly Will Not 11,500 68,791
Financial Net Worth + Housing
Median




Financial Net Worth + Housing
Median Mean
$ 240,000 $ 561,546
193,000 354,789
.
140,000 284,197
85,100 151,700
42,500 106,234
Source: Authors’ calculations